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SUPREME

COURT

MEYERS v. McCLELLAND.
No. 3.
Tort-Personal Injury-Automobile, Collision with Horse and Buggy-Negligence
-Contributory

Negligence-Refusing

In-

struction, Error Made Harmless by Answers
to Interrogatories.

1. Where there is a general verdict for
plaintiff on a complaint or. declaration stating two causes of action and there is no
way of determining upon which cause of
action the verdict is based, it is error for
which a new trial should be granted to refuse a properly tendered instruction for defendant applying to either cause of action.
2. But where answers to interrogatories
in the record are such as would entitle
plaintiff to a judgment on a particular cause
of action stated, the general verdict will be
sustained as based by the jury on such
cause of action, and the refusal to give an
Instruction applying to another stated cause
of action will be regarded as harmless error.
3. One is liable for the damages occasioned by driving his automobile at such
speed around the corner of intersecting city
streets as to enter on the left side of suclb
intersecting street and not to turn to the
right till too late to avert a collision with
a horse and buggy properly driven on that
side of the street in the opposite direction.
In such case negligence is predicated upon

four distinct violations of legal duty, namely: 1st, failure to travel on the right side
of the street; 2nd, failure to turn to the
right until too late to avert the injury; 3rd,
failure to keep the automobile in control so
as. to slacken its speed or stop it if necessary to avoid the collision; and 4th, failure
generally to exercise that degree of care
and caution commensurate with the increased danger and duty incident to travel
at the intersection of two public thoroughfares in the City of South Bend.
4. In such case a verdict will not be disturbed on the ground or alleged contributory negligence of plaintig in quickly turn-

ing her horse to the right in an effort to
avert the collision, where it appears that
this is just what a reasonably prudent person would have done in the circumstances.
or that such act of plaintiff was induced by
the imminent peril and fear in which she
was put by defendant's negligence as the
proximate cause.

Action in tort for personal injuries
by Mary McClelland against William
Meyers. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Richard B. Swift and Thomas V.
Truder for Appellant.
Charles B. Mulholland and Edwin
C. Donnelly for Appellee.

OF NOTRE

DAME

VURPILLAT, J. Appellant's automobile, driven by his son, collided
with the buggy of the appellee in
which she and her young daughter
were riding, and for the damages occasioned thereby the appellee brought
action against the appellant in the
Notre Dame Circuit Court. The complaint is in two paragraphs, the first
of which alleges in substance the following operative facts: that on
August 26, 1919, plaintiff, with her
young daughter, was driving lawfully and carefully along South Bend
Avenue in the City of South Bend;
that at that time the defendant's son
was driving defendant's automobile
under the employment and direction
of defendant; that defendant's son
carelessly and negligently drove and
managed said automobile in front of
plaintiff's horse and buggy so as with
great force and violence to drive it
against the buggy of plaintiff, thereby throwing plaintiff and her daughter out upon the hard pavement, by
reason of which plaintiff and her
daughter were injured and rendered
sick and disabled for six and eight
weeks respectively; that plaintiff
was, as the time of the collision, driving on the right side of the street in
the direction of her travel; that said
collision and damages were caused by
the careless and negligent conduct of
defendant's son while acting for the
defendant, and without any fault or
negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The second paragraph alleges
the same state of facts, but charges
the conduct of the defendant's son to
have been willful and malicious.
Defendant answered in general denial addressed to each paragraph of
complaint, and the issues thus formed were submitted to the jury for
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trial. A general verdict was returned for the plaintiff, assessing her
damages at seven hundred and fifty
dollars. Appellant's motion for new
trial was overruled and judgment
rendered on the verdict.
Appellant assigns as error for reversal of the judgment, the overruling of the motion for new trial, that
the verdict is not supported by the
evidence and is contrary to the evidence and the law.
Appellant assigns as error of the
trial court for which a new trial
should have been granted, the
court's refusal to give to the jury
numberl
instruction
defendant's
three which was properly tendered
The instruction reads as follows:
"If you find that the defendant had
knowledge of the situation requiring
the exercise of ordinary care and,
diligence to avert the injury; that
he had ability to and could have
avoided the resulting injury by the
exercise of ordinary care and diligence; and that he did all within his
power to avoid and avert the collision, then your verdict should be for
the defendant."
This instruction is substantially
correct in its statement of the law
applicable to the second paragraph
Wantoness is the
of complaint.
conscious failure by one charged with
a duty to exercise due care in the
discharge of that duty. Ellis v. Birmingham Waterworks (Ala.) 65 So.
805; 29 Cyc. 509. The test for determining whether there was wanton
and malicious infliction of the injury
complained of is the concurrence in
the case of these three elements,
namely: defendant's knowledge of
the situation requiring the exercise
of ordinary care and diligence to
avert the injury; defendant's ability

to avoid the injury by the exercise
of ordinary care and diligence in the
use of the means at hand; and defendant's omission to exercise such
care and diligence to avert the injury which, to the ordinary mind,
must apparently result from such
omission. Unless all three of these
elements concurred in evidence there
could be no recovery upon the second
paragraphof complaint. And ordinarily the appellant would have been
entitled to the giving of the instruction tendered.
Refusal to give a proper instruction tendered by a party is ground
for a new trial. Pennsylvania Co.
v. Miller, 35 Ohio St., 541-35 Am.
Dec. 630; Berlin v. Oglesby 65 Ind.
308; Maloy v. Bennett 15 Fed. 371;
unless the matter is contained in
other instructions Chicago etc. Ry.
Co. v. Ryan 165 Ill. 88-46 N. E. 208;
Cox v. Chicago Ry. Co. 95 Iowa 5464 N. W. 450; Cleveland etc. Ry Co.
v. Harrington 131 Ind. 426-30 N. E
37; or is not applicable to the evidence or the issues in the case. Illinois Steel Co. v. McFadden 196 Ill.
344-63 N. E. 671; McGovern v. Interurban Ry. Co. 136 Iowa 13-111 N,
W. 412-13 L. R. A. (NS) 476;
Clowdes v. Fresco Flume etc. Co. 118
Cal. 315-50 Pac. 373. Appellantfs
instruction was applicable to the issues -tendered on the second paragraph of complaint, and appears not
to have been covered by any other instructions. It would seem therefore
that appellant was entitled to the giving of the instruction.
Where there is a general verdict
for plaintiff on a complaint or declaration stating two causes of action, and there is no way of determininy upon which cause of action the
verdict is based, a refusal to give a
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proper instruction for the defendant
as to either cause of action is ground
for a new trial. Pennsylvania Co. v.
Miller, supra. And the judgment in
such case must be reversed for such
error, just as in the case where the
verdict is based on a complaint of two
or more paragraphs, one of which is
bad on demurrer. The Belt Ry. &
Stock Yards Co. v. Mann 107 Ind.
89-7 14. E. 893. In the appellant's
case, however, the jury returned
answers to interrogatories so clearly
establishing the right of the plaintiff, appellee, to recover upon her
first paragraph of complaint, that,
had the general been for the
appellant, appellee would have been
entitled to the judgment on such interrogatories non obstante veredicto.
These interrogatories show conclusively that the general verdict is
based on the first paragraph of complaint, and therefore they render
harmless any error that might have
been committed in refusing the tendered instruction. Furthermore, we
think the instruction is defective. It
states elements of fact which, if
found, would relieve defendant from
liability only on the second paragraph
of complaint, but it directs the jury
to return a verdict for the defendant
regardless of plaintiff's right to recover on the first paragraph of complaint. There was no error in refusing the tendered instruction, or in
overruling the motion for a new
trial for that cause. Wellston Coat
Co. v. Smith 65 Ohio St. 70-61 N. E.
143-55 L. R. A. 99; Chicago & St. L.
Ry. Co. v. Champion 9 Ind. App.
510-36 N. E. 221; Ryle v. McCormack
Harvester Co. 108 Wis. 81-84 N. W.
18-51 L. R. A. 906 Bagley v. Smith
10 N. Y. 489-61 Am. Dec. 756.
It remains to be determined wheth-

er the verdict of the jury on the first
paragraph of complaint is contrary
to the law and the evidence. The issues tendered by the general denial
to this paragraph are the negligence
of the defendant and the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff. Upon
these issues the plaintiff has the burden of proving the negligence charged against the defendant. And, although in most jurisdictions the
plaintiff is required to allege in his
complaint or declaration his own
freedom from contributory negligence, in the courts of England, the
Federal courts and the courts of the
majority of the States, the rule is
that the burden of proof rests upon
the defendant to affirmatively establish as a defense the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff. In Conn.,
Ill., Iowa, Main, Mass., Mich., N. H.,
N. Y. and Vermont, the exceptional
rule obtains that the plaintiff, to recover, must establish his own freedom from contributory negligence as
well as prove the negligence of defendant. As to the burden of proof
in negligence cases see 8 Encyc. of
Evidence 852; 7 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
of Law (2nd Ed.) 453; Beach on
Con. Neg. (2nd Ed.) Ch. 15; 3 Ellioton Evidence Sec. 2500.
Although the issues of negligence
and contributory negligence ordinarily present questions of fact for
the jury to determine, these must be
considered and determined in the
light of the law. The advent of the
automobile did not change the law
of the American highway, nor did it
modify the general rules of the law
of negligence.
Negligence exists where one fails
to exercise due care towards another
as required by law, the party to whom
the duty is owing being thereby dam-
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500-68 Atl. 110; Luedtka v. Jeofrey
89 Wis. 136-61 N. W. 292. And it
has been held that this duty to turn
to the right applies to persons who
meet each other at any part of the
highway, whether at a crossing or
elsewhere. Cook Brewing Co. v.
Ball 22 Ina. App. 656-52 N. E. 1002;
Molin v. Wark 113 Minn. 190-129
N. W. 383. And as a general rule
each traveler must give half the road
Walkup v. May 9 Ind. App. 409-36
N. E. 917. But it is the right of the
traveler to occupy any part of the
track on the right side of the way
that he may choose. Brooks v. Hart
14 N. H. 307; Quinn v. O'Keefe 41
N.
Y. Supp. 116. Each party has the
What are the duties imposed by the
right
to assume that the other will
law of the American highway which
law, will turn to the right
obey
the
a failure to observe may constitute
will
exercise ordinary care and
and
negligence and entail liability for thr
resultant damages. The first rule of prudence, and, so assuming, may dethe English common law of the high- termine his own action accordingly.
way is thus stated in an old rhyme: Bager v. Zimmerman (Iowa) 161 N
W. 479; Vanderhorst Brew. Co. v.
Amrine 98 Md. 406-56 At. 833; An"'Tis a law of the road,
gell v. Lewis 20 R. I. 391-39 Atl.
Though a paradox quite,
521-38 Am. St. Rep. 881; Ballard v.
If you keep to the left,
Collins 63 Wash. 493-115 Pac. 1050
You'll always be right."
The driver of an automobile and
The rule in America is the oppo- the driver of a horse, whether on the
site and may be stated in rhyme as an country road or on the city street
American parody to the English -whether at the intersection of city
paradox, thus:
streets or elsewhere, are both required to exercise such reasonable
care. prudence and diligence as the
'Tis the law of our road,
Not a paradox quite
circumstances demand. commensurate with the existing danger. Bab.
Like the English turn left,
bitt, Law of Motor Vehicles, 272;
For we always turn right.
Campbell v. Walver (Del.) 78 At!.
A prose statement of the rule in 601; Cumberland Telephone Co. v.
this country is that travelers pro- Yeiser (Kv.) 131 S. W .1049; Arlceeding in opposite directions when ington v. Horner (Kan.) 129 Pac.
meeting must turn to the right. El- 1159; Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown
liott on Roads & Streets 620. Tyler 165 Ind. 465-1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 238v. Nelson 109 Mich. 37-66 N. W. 74 N. E. 615-6 Annotated Cc. 656671; State v. Unwine 75 N. J. L. 18 Am. Neg. Rep. 392; Russ v.
aged. Chapin on Torts 499; Cooley
on Torts 279; 29 Cyc. 415 et seq.; 5
Words & Phrases 4743-4793. There
can be no fixed rule of law for determining negligence in all cases.
The degree of care exacted by the
law in each case must depend upon
the conditions and circumstances of
the particular case. Penn. Ry. Co. v.
Coon III Pa. 430-440--3 Atl. 234;
Jacksonville, T. & K. Ry. Co. v.
Peninsular Land Co. 27. Fla. 15717 L. R. A. 33. Negligence is the
absence of care according to circumstances. O'Toole v. Pittsburgh &. L.
Ry. Co. 158 Pa. St. 99-22 L. R. A.
606.

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
Strickland (Ark.) 197 S. W. 709.
The duty of the automobilist to drive
his car in a careful and prudent manner implies that his car should be
equipped with brakes and so operated as to control the speed of the car
and stop it, if need be, to avoid collision. Irving v. Judge 81 'Conn. 49271 Atl. 572; Owens v. Iowa Co.
(Iowa) 169 N. W. 388.
In the light of the foregoing propositions of law let us consider the
facts of the case upon which the jury
based their finding of negligence
against the appellant. At the time
appellant's automobile, operated by
his son, collided with appellee's buggy, the appellee was driving west in
South Bend Avenue on the right side
of the avenue, about seventy-five feet
from the intersection of St. Louis
Blvd. Appellant's automobile, coming north in St. Louis Blvd., turned
east into South Bend Avenue. The
appellee, Mary McClelland, said that
she first saw the automobile when it
turned the corner; that the car was
traveling at a high rate of speed and
coming directly towards her; that at
the time she saw the car she was on
her right side of the street with her
buggy four feet from the curbing;
that as soon as she became aware of
the approach of the car towards her
she turned her horse farther to the
right; that when the collision occurred the right front wheel of the buggy was against the curbing and her
horse was upon the parking beyond
the curbing.
The testimony of
Grace McClelland, appellee's daughter, corroborated that of her mother
in substance. And, as showing the
point where the cQllision took place
and the position of the buggy and
the occupants after the collision,
these two witnesses were corrobor-

ated by the testimony of Mr. Anderson and Dr. Berteling.
Appellant's son, who drove the car,
admitted that appellee's buggy was
at all times on the right side of South
Bend Avenue on which she was traveling; that he did not make an effort
to turn his car to the right till he
was within a few feet from appellee;
that when appellee turned her horse
farther to the right, the sudden turn
cramped the buggy and caused the
rear end to swerve towards the path
of the automobile; that the abrupt
turn of his car on the wet and slippery street caused the rear of the
car to skid and collide with appellee's
buggy on its rear wheel. This is substantially the testimony of the two
workmen who accompanied appellant's son in the car.
This evidence establishes four distinct violations of legal duty on the
part of the appellant towards the
appellee: First, failing to travel on
the right side or half of South Bend
Avenue; second, failure to turn his
car to the right, as he had ample
time and space to do, till it was too
late to avert the collision; third, failure to keep his automobile in control.
to slacken its speed, to stop it if
necessary, and to prevent its skidding and colliding; and fourth, failure generally to exercise the increased care and caution commensurate
with the increased duty and danger
incident to travel and turning at the
intersection of these two public
thoroughfares of the City of South
Bend. The general verdict is sustained by the record in its finding of
negligence against the appellant.
Appellant's counsel rather tacitly admit this negligence, for the burden of
their briefs is to sustain the charge
of contributory negligence against
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appellee. It is said by the court in
Ruter v Foy 46 Iowa 132, that when
the defendant seeks to establish contributory negligence of the plaintiff
as a defense, in so doing, he virtually admits his own negligence.
Burroughs on; Negligence, page
509, says: "Contributort negligence,
is such negligence on the part of the
plaintiff as to proximately cause the
injury complained of, superceding the
prior wrongful conduct of the defendant and rendering him incapable of
averting its consequences. Plaintiff
cannot maintain an action for injuries caused by negligence of defendant
if his own negligence contributed in
any degree to produce the result
complained of, unless the defendant
having knowledge of the plaintiff's
negligence, fails to use ordinary care
to avert the consequences; or the contributory negligence of plaintiff is
caused by the sudden peril and terror
in the situation wherein he has been
placed." See also Cooley on Torts
679; Chapin on Torts 541; Nave et al
v Flack 90 Ind. 205.
As a general rule contributory negligence is a question of fact for the
jury to determine. Berry, Automobiles 151-152; 7 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
of Law (2nd. Ed.) 456; 29 Cyc. 630;
Mathieson v Burlington, etc. Ry. Co.
125 Iowa 90-100 N. W. 51-16 Am.
Rep. 321; Christie v Elliott 216 111.
31-74 N. E. 1035-I L. R. A. (NS)
245-108 Am. St. Rep. 196.
The jury, by their general verdict
and their answers to the interrogatories,
exonorated
the plaintiff
from the charge of contributory negligence. Following are the interrogatories and answers bearing on this
issue: "I. When the collision occurred, was the plaintiff's horse and
buggy on her right side of the street?

Ans. Yes." "4. Was the plaintiff at
any time on her left side of the street,
-at the time of the collision, or during the period immediately preceding
it? Ans. No." "5 Did the defendant's son show negligence in failing
to turn to the right before he got
within a few feet of plaintiff's carriage? Ans. Yes."
The record discloses that plaintiff
was at all times conforming to the
law by traveling on the right side of
the street, and by driving in a careful and prudent manner, having regard for the safety of herself and
her daughter and doing all that a
reasonably prudent person could have
done to avoid the collision. Appellant's contention is that plaintiff, by
turning her horse to the right and
thereby, as he alleges, causing her
buggy to swerve somewhat towards
the path of the automobile, approximately contributed to the injury. Instead of constituting an act of contributory negligence, this conduct of
plaintiff shows a compliance with
the law of the road which reqlired
her to turn to the right, and it is just
what a prudent person would have
done to avert a collision made imminent and unavoidafle by the negligent and reckless conduct of the appellant's son in his palpable violation of the law in at least three particulars, already adverted to. But
if plaintiff's act be regarded as proximately contributing to her injury
it was obviously induced by the danger and fear of the situation intc
which she was placed by the negligence of the defendant.
We cite here three cases, the first
two of which bear striking analogy
in their facts to the appellant's case
all three of them being particularly
applicable to the issue of contribu-
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tory negligence, and all of them sustaining verdicts and judgments for
the injured parties. Molin v Wark
113 Minn. 190-129 N. W. 383-41 L.
R. A. (NS) 346; Irven v Judge 81
Conn. 492-71 Atl. 572; McIntire v
Orner 166 Ind. 57-76 N. E. 750-4 L.
R. A. (NS) 1130-117 Am. St. Rep.
359.

perty he offered to purchase is not an actionable tortious wrong.
6. On such a state of facts alleged by
plaintiff and established by the evidence, the
court should direct a verdict for defendants.
7. The constitutional guaranty of trial
by jury can be invoked only by one who has
a right of action at law.

Action by appellant, William Wilson, against the appellees, John Y.
Sherman and the firm of Biddle &

There is no error in the record and
the judgment of the trial court is
therefore affirmed.

Wendt, for $1700 damages alleged
to have been sustained because of the
wrongful and fraudulent transfer of
certain real estate to another after

WILSON v BIDDLE ET AL.

the appellant's purchase of the same
from appellees. From a judgment

(No. 4)
Alleged Tort-Refusal of Principal and
His Agents to Convey Land-ContractOffer and Acceptance--Communication of
Acceptance by Principal to His Agents-Acceptance of Another's Subsequent Offer
-Peremptory Instruction Directing Verdict
for Defendants--Constitutional Right of
Trial by Jury.

for defendants,
Affirmed.

plaintiff

appeals.

Edwin W. Hunter and Harry P.
Nester for Appellant.
Francis J. Clohessy and Joseph P.
O'Hara for Appellees.

VURPILLAT,

J.

Marion

Biddle

1. S., the owner of real estate in Indiana
resided in Illinois. His agents, B. & W., and William G. Wendt, as partnerq'
residing in Indiana, had authority to secure in the firm of Biddle and Wendt, had
a purchaser. They wrote to W., suggesting
that S.'s property was selling on certain ,been collecting rents tor their co-determs, stated. W. wired to B. & W.: "Ac- fendant, Sherman, who owned the
cept proposition, bases your letter." B. &
W. replied by letter, disclaiming any au- hotel property, cor. Michigan and
thority to make offer, but submitted W.'s
Colfax Sts. South Bend. Plaintiff
proposition to S. for acceptance. S. replied
to B. & W., authorizing them to accept the who resides in Elkhart, Indiana,
offer and inclosed deed to be delivered to W. wanted to buy the property. Biddle
Before communicating these facts to W.,
B. & W. received a better offer which they & Wendt wrote to plaintiff: "Sheralso submitted to S. and which he accepted. man property selling at $7,000 cash,
Sale was had and property transferred on
second offer. Held that W. had no right of or more than half cash, unless you
action, ex contractu or ex delicto.
want to wire us $7100, at least $3500
2. No contract is formed where a principal merely communicates his acceptance cash, balance one year, 6 per cent."
to his agents, so long as neither principal Letter dated Sept. 2, 1919.
nor agent dispatches such communication to
Next day, upon receipt of letter,
the offeror.
3. An acceptor, principal, owes no duty plaintiff telegraphed: "Accept propoto the third person to accept his offer, but
is legally free to reject it and accept a sub- sition, basis your letter. Am writsequent offer,--to sell his property to the ing." Same day plaintiff wrote a,
highest and best bidder.
4. The agent of such acceptor, principal, follows: "I write to confirm my telealthough instructed by him to communicate gram of this day and to add that as
his acceptance to such third person, owes no
duty to such third person to carry out such soon as you get the papers and the
instructions, and is not liable to him for abstract, I will pay you the $3500
nonfeasance in that respect.
5. In such case, where neither the prin- cash, and if you will make a fair discipal nor his agents owe any legal duty to count on the balance will pay all
the plaintiff, their willful refusal to close a
contract with him and convey to him pro- cash."
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Biddle & Wendt wrote in answer to
this letter and telegram: "We have
yours of the 3rd, and have no doubt
the proposition will be accepted. Our
letter was not intended as a proposition but we believe it will go through.
The owner when here led us to believe he would take $7,000 and we
will urge its acceptance. We have
written Mr. Sherman at his home in
Chicago and enclosed deed for him
to execute, conveying the property
to you. We feel satisfied Mr. Sherman will accept and send the deed.
We will advise you when we hear
from him." On the same day Biddle
& Wendt did send a letter to Sherman, advising acceptance and the
return of deed of conveyance properly executed for plaintiff.
On September 9, Sherman replied
to Biddle & Wendt's letter and enclosed' the deed properly executed
which would convey the property tc
plaintiff, with instructions to Biddle
& Wendt to accept the offer and deliver the deed.
By the time this letter arrived
with enclosure of deed, Biddle &
Wendt received from another person
an offer of $7300 for the property
and they immediately notified Sherman of this offer and enclosed new
deed to be executed in blank for the
insertion of the new purchaser's
name should they succeed in closing
deal with him, advised Sherman tc
execute it and suggested to him that
they would keep plaintiff in ignorance of the new negotiations until it
was seen that they could not be completed. Sherman sent the new deed
and expressed the hope that the new
deal might be closed. Biddle &
Wendt closed the deal with the second purchaser and then notified

plaintiff that Sherman had refused to
accept his proposition.
A complaint in three paragraphs
went out of the record on demurrer
and an amended complaint in one
paragraph was filed. This alleges
the facts to be substantially as above
stated, and made parts of the amended complaint by copy and reference
thereto the letters and telegram
quoted, except the second lettter of
Biddle & Wendt explaining to plaintiff that their Irst letter to him was
not intended as a proposition, but as
a suggestion which, if adopted,
would be forwarded to their co-defendant, Sherman, for acceptance upon their recommendation. It is further alleged that plaintiff's offer was
accepted by Sherman, who instruct
ed his co-defendants in writing to.
communicate such acceptance to
plaintiff and deliver to him the deed,
but that the defendants wrongfully
and fraudulently refused to transfer
the property so contracted for by
him, but instead, sold and transferred the same to a third person for
$7300; that said property was purchased by plaintiff of defendants as
a hotel site and that plaintiff could
not procure another. That by reason
of the wrong and fraud practised upon the plaintiff he was damaged in
the sum of $1700.
The defendants filed joint and separate demurrers to the amended
complaint. To the overruling of
these demurrers the defendants took
proper exceptions. Separate answer
in general denial was filed to the
amended complaint, and the issues
were submitted to the jury.
At the close of the plaintiff's case
in chief the court overruled a motion
of defendants to enter a nonsuit
against the plaintiff. At the conclu-
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sion of the defendants' case, the
court, over appellant's objection, peremptorily instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendants;
which was accordingly done.
The appellant assigns as error fox
the reversal of the judgment the overruling of his motion for a new trial
the giving over his objection of the
peremptory instruction, that the verdict is contrary to law and is not sustained by sufficient evidence.
The evidence in the record discloses no more facts than those alleged
in the amended complaint.
The
amended complaint does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action in behalf of the appellant,
either upon the theory of breach of
contract or upon the theory of tort
by fraud. No facts are plead or
proven that show a primary substantive law right in the plaintiff, or any
legal duty owing to him from the
defendants or any of them, and consequently no facts that' constitute
breach of duty and violation of right.
In brief, none of the essential elements of a right of action is either
plead or proven. For this reason
the demurrer to the amended complaint should have been sustained.
And for the same reason, any verdict that might have been returned
for the appellant would have been
contrary to law and not supported
by sufficient facts, and the trial court
would have been obliged to set asid(
such verdict and grant a new trial.
It is just such a situation that warrants the court, indeed, that makes it
the court's duty, to direct the verdict
by peremptory instruction. Speaking upon this point Justice Miller, in
Pleasants v Fant, 22 Wallace 116-22
L. Ed. 780, says: "Must the court go
through the idle ceremony in such a

case, of submitting to the jury the
testimony on which the plaintiff relies, when it is clear to the judicial
mind that, if the jury should find a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, that
verdict would be set aside and a new
trial had ?"
This doctrine is approved and followed by the Federal courts. Coughran v Bigelow 164 U. S. 301-17 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 117-41 L. Ed. 442; Patten v
Texas etc. Ry. Co. 179 U. S. 658-21
Sup. Ct. Rep. 275-45 L. Ed. 361. See
also Felton v Spiro 78 Fed. 576. But
where, as contended by appellant's
counsel, there is legal evidence tending to sustain the material allegations of the complaint, or where the
finding of facts depends upon the
credibility of the witnesses and upon
inferences and deductions to be;
drawn from the established facts, it
is an invasion of the province of the
jury for the court to direct the verdict. Adams v Kennedy 90 Ind. 318;
Haughton v Aetna Life Ins. Co. 165
Ind. 32-73 N. E. 592. But see the
following Indiana cases which sustain directed verdicts on account of
a failure of proof on the part of
plaintiff. Oleson v Lake Shore Ry.
Co. 143 Ind. 405-42 N. E. 736-32 L.
R. A. 149; Weis v City of Madison
75 Ind. 241-39 Am. Rep. 135. Judge
Elliott in his work on Evidence, Vol.
I Sec. 31 states the rule thus: "It is
settled that the question whether
there is any evidence or not upon an
issue or issues in a cause is a question
for the court. At first blush it 'may
seem that the doctrine that the court
must determine whether there is any
evidence trenches upon the funda.
mental principle that questions of
fact are for the jury, but upon closer
scrutiny it will be found that there is
no invasion of that principle. If in
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law there is no legal evidence, then
there is nothing for the consideration
of the jury and the whole question resolves itself into one of law. Verdicts must rest on legal evidence and
by such evidence facts must be presented; if, therefore, there is no such
evidence the functions of the jury are
not called into exercise."
Appellant contends for the rule
that if there is any evidence at all in
support of his cause of action, the
court erred in directing the verdict.
In Hathaway v East Tenn. Ry. Co.
29 Fed. 4889, the court says: "Decided cases may be found where it is
held that if there is a scintilla of evidence in support of a case, the judge
is bound to leave it to the jury; but
the modern decisions have established a more reasonable rule, to-wit:
that before the evidence is left to the
jury, there is or may be in every case
a preliminary question for the judge
not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon
which the jury can properly proceed
to find .a verdict for the party producing it upon whom the burden of
proof is imposed." Cudahy Packing
Co. v Marcan 106 Fed. 645; Cowles
v Chicago etc. Ry. Co (Iowa) 88 N.
W. 1072; Philadelphia etc. Ry. Co. '
Fronk 67 Md. 339-1 Am. St. Rep.
390! Anders v Life Ins. Co. 62 Neb
585-87 N. W. 331; McNaul v Arnold
177 Pa. St. 433-35 Atl. 672; Offutt v
Columbia Ex. 175 I1. 472-51 N. E.
651. Judge Elliott says: "The adjudged cases, and they are very
numerous, warrant the conclusion
that where there is nothing more
than a scintilla of evidence it is the
duty of the court to decide the case
and not submit it to the jury." Elliott on Evidence Vol. I Sec. 32. Jones
(-I Evidence (2nd Ed.) 292.

The verdict of the jury was properly directed by the court, not only
on the ground of a failure of legal
evidence upon which to base a verdict for appellant, but also on the
ground of a fatal variance between
the complaint and such proof as
there was. The prevailing theory of
appellant's complaint is fraud, while
the evidence introduced tends only tc
establish a breach of contract. In
Pomeroy on Remedies, page 554, it
is said: "These causes of action differ in substance. One is upon a contract and the other in tort, and the
law will not permit a recovery upon
one by showing a right of recovery
upon the other." Jones on Evidence
295; Lowe v Turpie 147 Ind. 652-44
N. E. 259-47 N. E. 150-37 L. R. A.
233; Armcost v Lindley 116 Ind.
295-19 N. E. 138; Itenrk County v
Citizens Bank 208 Mo. 209-106 S. W.
622-14 L. R. A. (NS) 1052. Note 46
to 50 L. R. A. (NS) 14.
Appellant's counsel quote as a point
in their brief the provision of the Indiana Constitution that "in all civil
cases, the right by jury shall remain
inviolate." Art. I, Sec. 20. The constitutional right of trial by jury may
be invoked only by those who have a
right of action at law. Lynch v The
Railroad Co. (N. Y.) 29 N. E. 315.
Black on Constitutional Law, page
627, says: "Notwithstanding some
difference of opinion, it is now generally agreed that the right of trial
by jury does not include the right to
have the jury render a verdict in
case where the law is clearly againsi
the pltintiff. The jury are to try and
determine the facts, but it is the
court which must declare the law applicable to the facts. Consequently
when the judge, at the close of the
plaint.ff's evidence, orders a per-
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emptory nonsuit, on the ground that, the appellant some legal duty at the
conceding all the facts which the time and under the circumstances
jury could find from the evidence, complained of, a breach of which
those facts are not sufficient to es- would give to appellant a right of actablish a liability against the defend- tion against them. We do not think
ant, such action is no violation of the the pleading and the proof establish
plaintiff's constitutional rights." The a right of action in the plaintiff,
Indiana Supreme Court, speaking of either ex-contractu or ex delicto.
this provision, in a case involving Any judgment rendered by the court
peremptory
instruction,
says:
must be in observance of the funda"Courts have guarded this right, mental principle secundum allegata
with scrupulous care, against any en- et probate. Phillips on Code Pleadcroachment. In all cases triable by ing, See. 79. Neudecker v Kohlberg
jury the jurors are the sole and ex- 81 N. Y. 296.
clusive judges of the facts proved,
The letter of Biddle & Wendt of
and, of necessity, therefore, of the Sept. 2, 1919, contained a definite ofwitnesses, and of the weight to be fer to sell to appellant the Sherman
given to their testimony. Where up- property, and appellant's telegram
on a material point there is a failure and letter confirming it constitute an
of proof in the evidence of the party unconditional acceptance of the ofhaving the burden of an issue, the fer; so that, as between these parties
court may, as a matter of law, in- themselves, a contract would result.
struct the jury in favor of the other Anson on Contracts '22. Biddle &
party to such issue. Where the facts Wendt, however, were not making
are admitted by the pleadings or an offer for themselves. They did
otherwise, or where the evidence up- not own the Sherman property.
on the controlling question is docu- Sherman is made a party defendant
mentary, and its interpretation and as the owner of the property, and it
construction a matter for the court is obvious, therefore, that no contract
and but one conclusion deducible resulted, unless Biddle & Wendt had
therefrom, then in such cases, the authority from Sherman at the time
court may, as a matter of law, direct to make such offer. The second leta verdict in accordance with the evi- ter of Biddle & Wendt to appellant,
dent facts, and in favor of the party properly admitted in evidence over
having the affirmative of the issue." the objection of appellant, and the
Haughton v Aetna Life Ins. Co. 165 subsequent transactions of the parInd. 32-39-73 N. E. 592. Appellant's ties, establish the authority of Biddle
case is just such as is here described & Wendt to procure and submit ofin the concluding language of the Su- fers to Sherman for his property. Acpreme Court of Indiana: a case which cordingly Biddle & Wendt forwarded
involves the interpretation and con- appellant's offer to Sherman, who exstruction of documentary evidence ecuted a deed which would convey
by the court to determine, as a mat- the property to appellant and sent
ter of law, whether or not appellant this deed to Biddle & Wendt, his own
acquired any contractual rights agents, with written instructions to
against the appellees or any of them, them to close the deal and deliver
so that they can be said to have owed the deed. These are all the opera-
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tive facts in appellant's case, and
they are not sufficient to transfer the
property to appellant, or to form a
contract with him.
The deed was never delivered to
appellant, and delivery of a deed by
a grantor to his own agent, with instructions to deliver to the grantee,
is not a delivery to the grantee. Madden v Cheshire Provident Institution
(Kan.)
94 Pac. 793. Williams v
Daubner 103 Wis. 521-79 N. W. 748;
Osborn v Eslinger 155 Ind. 355-58
N. E. 439; Morris v Caudel 178 Ill.
9-52 N. E. 1036-44 L. R. A. 489;
Mudd v Dillon (Mo.) 65 S. W. 973;
Ball v Foreman 37 Ohio St. 132.
Nor was the communication of
Sherman's intention to accept appellant's offer ever made to appellant
by Sherman himself or by his agents.
Therefore no contract was formed.
Anson on Contracts. 17. As said in
Madden v Cheshire Provident Institution, supra, "Keeping in mind the
fact that (Biddle & Wendt) were
(Sherman's) agents and not (appellant's) and that what one does
through and by an agent he does
through and by himself, it cannot be
said that the owner of the property
accepted the offer of (appellant), so
long as the acceptance was within his
control. It was as much in his control while in the possession of his
agents at (South Bend) as though
the deed which had been executed
and the letter of instructions to hisagents had been left upon his desk
in (Chicago). So long as they were
in the hands of his agents they were
in his own hands." Where a property
owner instructed his agent to make
immediate payment of the premium
on a fire insurance policy which the
insurance company had offered him,
held, there was no acceptance of the

policy where payment of the premium was delayed by the agent till
after the fire. New v Germania Fire
Ins. Co. et al. 171 Ind. 33-85 N. E.
703. Having acquired no contract
rights against Sherman, the principal, and, of course, none against his
agents, the co-defendants, Biddle &
Wendt, it follows that the defendants
owed no duty to appellant; and since
they owed him no duty, he can maintain no action against them.
The complaint alleges that the defendants "fraudulently iefused to
convey to the plaintiff the above described property, but have sold said
property to another without the consent or knowledge of the plaintiff."
These alleged facts are not fraudulent but are clearly within the legal
rights of the defendants to do in discharging their duties and subserving
their own interests. Biddle & Wendt
owed loyalty and good faith to their
principal, Sherman. To him alone
are they answerable for any failure
to carry out his instructions. They
were under no obligation whatever
to appellant. It is a general rule that
agents are liable to third persons for
misfeasance only, and not for nonfeasance. Therefore an agent is not
liable to third persons merely because
of his failure to perform a duty which
he owes to his principal. Tiffany on
Agency 382; Madden v Cheshire
Provident Inst., supra. "His liability
• . . is solely to his principal, there
being no privity between him and
such third person." Story on Agency,
Sec. 308; Chapin on Torts 171; Henshaw v. Noble 7 Ohio St. 226; Labadie v. Hawley 61 Tex. 177-48 Am.
Rep. 278. As a matter of good faith,
the agents, Biddle & Wendt, were
bound to inform their principal.
Sherman, of the highest and best bid
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or offer they might receive for his
property. Hegenmyer v. Mark 37
Minn. 6-32 N. W. 785-5 Am. St. Rep.
808. And the defendant, Sherman,
was under no obligation whatever to
accept appellant's offer for his property, but instead was legally free to
sell to the highest and best bidder,
either directly or through his agents,
as he did in this case. The omission
to act, however, willful, is not actionable unless there is a legal duty to
act. Ellis v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (Ala.) 65 So. 805.
Defendants could not be liable for
depriving appellant of the benefits of
his alleged contract, for there was
no contract formed. Appellant acquired no right in personcm against
the defendants, and therefore there
could exist no right of action ex contractu. Neither could defendants
fraudulently deprive appellant of
such contract benefits, for fraud is a
tort founded upon the violation of
some right in rem which everybody
owes a duty to respect, and in ap-

pellant's case he had no such right
with respect to the alleged ocntract
and the defendants owed him no duty
in the premises. It has been held
that where a maker executes and delivers his promissory note to the
payee for an illegal consideration
known to both. and the payee negotiates the note to a bona fide purchaser who enforces collection thereof from the maker. the maker cannot
recover from the payee on the alleged
ground of wrongful and fraudulent
transfer of the note by the payee;
for the reason that such payee owes
the maker no duty to retain such note
in his possession. Haynes v. Rudd
102 N. Y. 372-7 N. E. 287-55 Am.
Rep. 815; Koepke et al. v. Peper 155
Iowa 687-136 N. W. 902-45 L. R. A.
The Iowa Supreme
(NS) 773).
Court, in the last case cited, in reversing a judgment for plaintiff, declared that "the verdict should have
been directed for the defendant."
Finding no error in the record, the
judgment is affirmed.
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BRIEF OF HARRY P. NESTER IN CASE OF

WILSON v. BIDDLE et al.
In the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
James Wilson, Appellant,
VS.
Marion Biddle and Win. G. Wendt,
partners in the real estate business, and John Y. Sherman, Appellees.
Brief for Appellant.
By Harry P. Nester.
1.

NATURE OF THE ACTION.

John Y. Sherman was the owner
of certain real estate located in the
city of South Bend, state of Indiana,
and rented such property through the
agency of Biddle and Went, his codefndants, who also collected the
rents for said property, and cared for
it generally.
James Wilson, the appellant, desiring to purchase property suitable
for a hotel site, entered into negotiations with Biddle and Wendt for the
purchase of the Sherman property.
These negotiations took the form of
letters exchanged between the parties litigant, and were introduced as
exhibits on the trial of the cause in
the lower court, but since the determining of their force and effect is s
vital issue in this case, they are set
out below:
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO 1.
South Bend, Indiana,
Sept. 2nd, 1919.
Mr. Jaes Wilson,
362 S. Hill St.
Elkhart, Ind.
Dear Sir:Sherman property selling at $7000.
cash or more than half cash; unless

you want to wire us $7100., $3500.
cash, balance one year at 6 per cent.
Biddle and Went,
per Biddle.
The foregoing was a letter received'
by James Wilson from Biddle and
Wendt, immediately upon the receipt of which he telegraphed Biddle
and Wendt as follows:
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 2.
Western Union Telegram.
Biddle and Wendt,
501 M. S. Bldg.,
South Bend, Ind.
Accept proposition, basis your letter. Am writing.
James Wilson.
And on the same day, further communicated with Biddle and Wendt by
the following letter:
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 3.
Elkhart, Ind.
Sept. 3rd, 1919.
Biddle and Went,
South Bend, Ind.
Gentlemen:
I write to confirin my telegram of
this day and to add that as soon as
you get the papers and the abstract
I will pay you the $3500. cash, and if
you will make a fair discount on the
balance, will pay all cash.
Sincerely yours,
James Wilkon.
Several days later the appellant
received the following letter from
Biddle and Wendt:
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 1.
South Bend, Ind.,
Sept. 4th, 1919.
Mr. James Wilson,
Elkhart, Ind.
Dear Sir:We have yours of the third and
have no doubt the proposition will
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be accepted. Our letter was not intended as a proposition, but we believe it will go through. The ownei
When here led us to believe he would
take $7000. and we will urge its acceptance.
We have written Mr. Sherman at
his home- in Chicago, and enclosed
deed for him to execute, conveying
the property to you. We feel satisfied Mr. Sherman will accept and
send the deed. We will advise you
when we hear from him.
Biddle and Wendt.
ler Biddle.
On the same day on which the foregoing letter was written, Biddle and
Wendt did communicate with John
Y. Sherman, which letter is as follows:
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 4.
South Bend, Ind.
Sept. 4th, 1919.
Mr. John Y. Sherman,
Chicago, Illinois.
Dear John:
I am sending-you herewith a deed
transferring your propqrty at the
corner of Colfax and Michigan
streets in this city to a James Wilson
of Elkhart, one of the few customers
who have quickly responded to our
proposal sent out on the 2nd instant.
I believe he is sincere in his statements as to the payment of money
which he sets forth in his letters sent
herewith and which kindly return to
us for filing in our records. Of
course it is up to you to decide on any
discount. We would encourage acceptance of this offer. In the meantime we will keep watch for any better offer. Should one come we will
hold up this matter until we have
communicated with you.
Sincerely yours,
Marion Biddle.

In reply to the above letter John Y.
Sherman wrote the following:
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 5.
Chicago, Illinois,
Sept. 9th, 1919.
Mr. Marion Biddle,
South Bend, Ind.
Dear Marion:
I am returning the deed for the
transfer of my property at the cornei
of Colfax Avenue and Michigan
Street to a man named Wilson.
Sincerely yours,
John Y, Sherman.
The appellant, believing that a
valid and binding contract had been
entered into between himself and the
co-defendants, tendered the purchase
price provided for, but Biddle and
Wendt refused to transfer and de.
liver the deed as ordered by Sherman,
and subsequently sold the property
to another person for $7300. because
of which the appellant was damaged
to the extent of $1500. which he seeks
to recover in this action.
2. ISSUES PRESENTED.
A complaint in three paragraphs
was filed, to which the defendants
demurred.
Demurrer
sustained.
Plaintiff then filed amended complain'
in one paragraph, alleging the facts
above set out, and asked for a verdict of $1500. damages. Defend.
ants demurred to amended complaint.
and such demurrer being overruled
filed answer in one paragraph in
general denial. The cause being at
issue, trial was had by jury. At the
conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence,
the defendant moved the court to dismiss the action because of insufficiency of evidence, which motion
was denied. When the defendantt
had rested their case, the court gavr
the jury the peremptory instructions
to return a verdict in favor of the de-
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fendants, holding that the plaintiffs an unconditional acceptance of said
cause of action had sounded in tort, offer (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2) and
and since fraud had not been suf- followed this telegram by a letter,
ficiently shown, they were not en- (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3) in which
titled to recover on their complaint, he further manifested his desire tc
Verdict was accordingly returned buy the property offered at once
in favor of the defendants.
Wilson further testified that he has
3. ERRORS ASSIGNED AS
ever been ready and willing to keep
CAUSE FOR REVERSAL.
the terms of the agreement, and on
The appellant assigns as errors for two separate occasions went to the
reversal of the judgment:
offices of Biddle and Wendt to close
1. The verdict of the jury is not the deal, but they were unwilling to
sustained by sufficient evidence.
do so, and put him off by stating
2. The verdict of the jury is con- first that they had not received the
trary to the law.
deed, and later, that it was improper
3. The court erred in giving to in form and would have to be rectified
the jury over appellant's objection before the deal could be closed. He
the peremptory instruction to return testified that when he learned later
a verdict for defendants.
that the prpoerty had been sold to
4. The court erred in overruling another man, he made diligent search
appellant's motion for new trial.
for property which would meet his
requirements and could be obtained
4. CONCISE STATEMENT OF
for the same price, but was.unable tc
THE EVIDENCE.
The witnesses introduced were sc locate such property, to his damage.
numerous, and the volume of testiMarion Biddle next testified that
mony taken was so great, as to pro- he was a member of the firm of Bid
hibit an exhaustive treatise in this dle and Wendt, and transacted mos!
work. A brief resume is all that is of the business for said firm. He said
practical here. This we will endeav- he had written James Wilson that
or to give.
the Serman property was for sale
James Wilson, the plaintiff, taking but denied that such letter was inthe stand in his own behalf, testified tended as an offer. He acknowledged
that he was a resident of Elkhart, the receipt of Wilson's letter and
Indiana, and being desirous of pur- telegram, and stated that he had rechasing property for a hotel site, had written Wilson (Defendant's Exconferred with Biddle and Wendt as hibit No. 1), and that he had alsc
to securing such a site. They in- written to John Y. Sherman in
formed him that he would be noti- Chicago, (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4),
fied if they found suitable property. informing him of the opportunity tc
Later he (James Wilson) received a sell his property to Wilson, and had
letter from Biddle and Wendt, (Inenclosed a deed for Sherman to exetroduced in evidence as Plaintiffts cute, conveying the property to WilExhibt No. 1) which contained, an son. Biddle further testified that he
offer to sell him a certain property later received a reply from Sherman
owned by John Y. Sherman of
(Plaintiffg Exhibit No. 5) ordering
Chicago. He testified that he im- him to close the deal with Wilson.
mediately wired Biddle and Wendt He admitted that a properly executed
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deed conveying title to James Wilson
was enclosed with this letter from

Sherman. He said that Wilson had
subsequently called at his office concerning the property, but he (Biddle), when questioned, could give no
satisfactory reason for his refusal to
deliver the deed to Wilson. Biddle
further testified that while the deed
was in his possession, he had held
himself open for other offers to buy
the property in controversy, and
finally secured a purchaser whc
bought the property for $7300.
John Y. Sherman was next called,
and testified that he was a resident of
Chicago, and owned the property at
the corner of Colfax Avenue and
Michigan Street in South Bend, Indiana. He said that Biddle and
Wendt were his duly appointed
agents, with the power to dispose of
said property. He said that upon the
receipt of Marion Biddle's letter concerning the sale of his property to
James Wilson, he had immediately
executed a deed conveying the property to Wilson, and returned said
deed to Biddle with the instructions
to close the deal. He testified that
later he had received a letter from
Biddle requesting him to execute another deed, conveying the property tor
one Drexel, which he had accordingly done, and forwarded the deed to
Biddle.
William G. Wendt was next called
to give testimony. He said that hc
was a member of the firm of Biddle
and Wendt, but gave little attention
to the firms business matters, being
out of the city most of the time. He
appeared to know nothing of the
facts and circumstances which led to
The
this case, and was excused.
plaintiff introduced Edward M. Doran and Leo J. Hastings, who testified

that they were real estate men of
They both
South Bend, Indiana.
testified that the present market
value of the property in controversy
was approximately $8500.00 and testified as to the scarcity of property
in any location which would serve the
plaintiffs purposes.
This is the substance of the evidence introduced. Other minor witnesses were introduced, but as their
testimony neither added to nor detracted from the merits of the case,
we may safely disregard them.
5. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.
In a consideration of this case,
there are.three outstanding questions
to be dealt with. They may be briefly stated as follows:
1. The appellant and the appellees
entered into a good and binding contract for the sale of the Sherman property.
Anson on Contracts 57.
2. The trial court errer in giving
the peremptory instruction. 6 Encyc.
of Ev. 50; The City of New Albany v.
Ray 3 Ind. App. 321; Adams v. Kennedy 90 Ind. 318; Haughton v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co. 165 Ind. 32.
3. The plaintiff proved sufficient
fraud to entitle him to a verdict.
Shaeffer v. Sleade et al. 7 Blackf.
178; Peter v. Wright et al. 6 Ind.
183; Pritchett v. Ahrens et al. 26 Ind.
App. 56; Friedmann et al. v. Campfield (Mich.) 52 N. W. 630; Williams
et al. v. Harris, Sheriff (S. Dak.) 54
N. W. 926.
6. ARGUMENT.
Proceeding in logical order, we
come first to the negotiations and
agreement entered into between the
appellant and Marion Biddle, which
forms the foundation of this action.
The lower court due to its peremptory disposition of this cause, did not
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pass upon this issue, hence we dwell
upon it briefly. The contention of
the appellant that plaintiff's exhibits
1 and 2 form the basis of a good and
binding contract was disputed by the
appellees, who introduced Defendant's Exhibit 1 to prove a revocation
of any offer which may have been received by the appellant. In admitting said Exhibit over the objection
of the appellant, the lower court committed its first error, for the subsequent execution of the deed proved
the existing contract, and estopped
the appellees from denying its force
and effect.- (Anson on Contracts
It is a
page 57, Chap. 2 Sect. 2)
principle of law too fundamental to
admit of cavil that an offer cannot
be revoked by the offeror after its unconditional acceptance by another
person. The subsequent assertion of
Biddle, that his letter to the appellant was not intended as an offer,
bears little weight. This is a question for the court to decide, and not
one to be disposed of lightly by a
contracting party, as best suits. his
interests. If a person were permitted to dispose of his contractual liabilities by a simple denial, then every
commercial usage would be undermined, and unscrupulous persons be
held guilty of no greater offense than
bad faith.
As to the alleged failure of the appellant to prove sufficient fraud in the
court below, and as to the peremptory instructions given by the court,
we may treat these two topics as one,
for a decision reached upon either,
automatically decides the other. The
question which now confronts us,
therefore, is, what is fraud, and what
degree of fraud must be proved to
entitle the plaintiff to a verdict of the
jury upon the facts of the case?

As early as 7 Blackford, 178, we
find the Supreme Court of this state
declaring that, "An action may be
maintained at law for false representations, made by a vendor to a purchaser, of matters within the particular knowledge of the vendor,
whereby the purchaser is injured."
How could the acts of the appelle
Biddle be characterized, if not fraudulent, where he, having a perfectly
executed deed in his possession, first
denies that he has the same, and then
later says that it is imperfectly executed, and tells the appellant that he
must wait until such defect is remedied? And during this time, while
Biddle had the appellant cleverly deceived, the former was perpetrating
a double wrong, for not only was he
depriving the appellant of obtaining
possession of the land he had contracted to buy and which Biddle had
been ordered to sell, but he was also
preventing the appellant from looking elsewhere for a suitable location,
for the latter had implicit faith in
his contract, and took no measures
to protect himself, against the forWhich
mer's fraudulent designs.
facts make the decision of the court
in 6 Ind. 183. particularly applicable
to the case at bar; the court said,
"Where a party designedly produces
a false impression, in order to mislead, entray, or obtain undue advantage over another-in every such case
there is a fraud, an evil act and an
evil intent,-Fraud may be deducted
not only from deceptive or false representations, but from facts, incidents, and circumstances which may
be trivial in themselves, but decisive
in the given case of a fraudulent design." 26 Ind. App. 56. "The denial
of that which has been previously affirmed constitutes fraud, where an-
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other who was induced to act by the
first statement, is thereby injured."
6 Encyc. of Evidence 50. If the facts
and circumstances in evidence are
such as to lead a reasonable man to
believe that fraud exists, that is all
that is required by the law.-54 N.
W. 926.
The act of the lower court in giving the jury the peremptory instruction to return a verdict for the defendant, because of the failure to return a verdict for the defendant, because of the failure of the plaintiff
to prove fraud, was clearly done under a misconception. The appellant
realizes that in many jurisdictions,
the rule laid down by the court would
apply, but an exhaustive research of
Indiana decisions will reveal the fact
that the local law differs from the
general rule. The "Scintilla of Evidence Rule" as advanced by the appellant, ignored by the court, and
scoffed at by the attorneys for the
defense is nevertheless the law applied in Indiana-The appellee in
contesting the appellants motion for
a new trial, cited several federal
court cases which held this rule tc
be no longer in effect. Perhaps that
is true of federal courts, and may
even hold good in some state courts.
but as our own Supreme Court has
said in 165 Ind. 32, after applying
the "Scintilla Doctrine," "The rule as
to directing verdicts is different in
the federal courts from that. of the
Indiana Courts. When the judgment
of the judge upon the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain the verdict is
innoked by a motion for a new trial
then it becomes his duty under the
law to weigh the evidence for himself, and either to conform or over-

throw the conclusions of the jury, as
in his opinion the preponderence of
evidence may require. But until such
time as the matter may be thus
brought before him, the duty of
weighing the evidence must be left
to the jury where the law has placed
it.
That this rule has long been in
force is evident from the fact that in
an early case in 3 Ind. App. 321, we
find the court declaring that "It is
within the power of the trial court
to control the verdict by instructions
only when there is a total absence of
evidence upon some essential issue,
or where there is no conflict, and the
evidence is susceptable of but one inference."
In 90 Ind. 318, the court said,
"Where, on the trial of a civil action
the plaintiff introduces evidence tending to sustain the material allegations of his complaint, it is error for
the court to invade the province of
the jury, and instruct them to return
a verdict for the defendant."
6- Encyc. of Evid. 50.-Actual
fraud is a question of fact to be determined by the jury from a consideration of all the evidence before
them, and where the evidence, upon
the whole, to a reasonable degree of
certainty, tends to sustain the charge
of fraud, and should be submitted to
the jury.
In conclusion the appellant merely
wishes to point out to the court the
undisputable correctness of the cases
cited, and feels confident that a review of these cases will convince thc
learned Supreme Court that the lower court erred in its decision, whicl
should accordingly be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
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BRIEF OF FRANCIS J. CLOHESSY IN CASE OF
WILSON v. BIDDLE et al.
In the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
James Wilson, Appellant.
VS.
Marion Biddle and William G. Wendt
partners in the real estate business
doing business under the firm name
of Biddle and Wendt; and John Y.
Sherman, Appellees.
Brief for Appellees.
By Francis J. Clohessy.
The statement of the record as contained in appellant's brief is correc
and requires no comment or amendment from appellees.
We proceed at once to a statemen'
of the points and authorities relied
upon by appellees to sustain the judgment and decision of the court:
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.
I.
Fraud is a tort.
Shirk vs. Mitchell, 137 Indiana 185,
II.
Breach of contract is not a tort.
Shirk vs. Mitchell, 137 Indiana
185;
Rose vs. Hurley, 39 Indiana 77;
Denning vs. State (cal.), 55 Pac.
1000;
Carpenter Paper Case (Neb.), 87
N. W. 1050;
Barkley vs. Williams, 64 N. Y. Sup.
318;
Bouvier's Dictionary, Page 1215;
Words and Phrases, Page 7008.
III.
In order that plaintiff may recovet
judgment on his cause of action there
must be no variance and failure of
proof between the pleadings and the
evidence.

Bremmerman vs. Jennings, 101 Indiana 253;
Armacost vs. Lindley, 116 Indiana
295;
Snaders vs. Hartge, 17 Ind. App.
243;
Lowe vs. Turpie, 147 Indiana 652;
Schilling Case, 57 Ind. 9pp. 131;
Pierce vs. Carey, 37 Wisconsin
232;
Henote vs. Bergman, 44 Florida
589;
Works
Harvester
Minneapolis
Case, 30 Minn. 399;
Degraw vs. Elmora, 50 N. Y. 1;
Note, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 14.
IV.
When a variance and failure of
proof exists between the pleadings as
set forth in plaintiff's complaint and
the evidence, the court has the power
and right, in fact is duty bound to
direct a verdict for the defendant.
Cincinnati Railway Case, 61 Indiana 183;
Dodge vs. Gaylord, 53 Indiana 377;
Hynds vs. Hays, 25 Indiana 31;
Griggs vs. Houston, 104 U. S. 553;
Anthony vs. Wheeler, 130 Ill. 128;
Corning vs. Troy Factory, 44 N. Y.
577;
Carpenter vs. Huffsteller, 87 N. C.
273;
Johnson vs. Moss, 45 Cal. 515;
Volkening vs. DeGraf, 81 N. Y.
268;
Pendleton vs. Dalton, 96 N. C. 507;
Faulkner vs. Faulkner, 73 Missouri 327;
Hackett vs. Bank, 57 Cal. 3-35;
Rothe vs. Rothe, 31 Wis. 570;
Bank vs. Schultz, 2 Ohio 471;
Goodlett vs. Louisville et all, 122
U:S. 391;
Grand Trunk R. R. Co. Case 18
Mich. 170;
Order of Chosen Friends Case, 64
Mich. 671;
Deyo vs. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 33 N
Y. 9;
Metropolitan R. R. Co., Case, 121
U. S. 558;
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Note in 2 L. R. A. 340;
fraudulent representations have no
Note in 85 American Decisions element of contract in them but are
706;
essentially a tort."
Note in 4 L. R. A. 778.
It is said in Denning against State,
V.
55 Pacific 1000, a California case:
There is always a preliminary
"A tort is any wrong not consistquestion for the judge whether there
ing in mere breach of contract for
is evidence upon which the jury may
which the law undertakes to give to
properly proceed to find a verdict.
the injured party some appropriate
Metropolitan R. R. Co. Case 121
remedy against the wrong-doer."
U. S. 558;
Words and Phrases at page 7008
Hunt vs. Chosen Friends, 64 Mich.
defines a tort as an injury inflicted
671;
Beard vs. Railway Co., 79 Iowa otherwise than by a mere breach of
518;
Anthony vs. Wheeler, 130 Illinois contract.
Bouvier defines a tort in its legal
128;
Deyo vs. Railway Co., 34 N. Y. 9; sense as a wrong independent of
Achtenhagen vs. Watertown, 18 contract.
Wis. 331;
It thus clearly appears that mere
Ellis vs. Ohio Life Insurance Co., breach of contract is not fraud. In
4 Ohio 628;
other words a breach of contract is
Jones on Evidence, Page
not
a tort, fraud being a tort: The
Thompson on Pleadings, Section
appellant therefore failed in his
proof when he alleged fraud in his
ARGUMENT.
Counsel for the Appellant have complaint and offered evidence at the
presented such a full and able dis- trial which tended only to prove mere
cussion of the issues had and evidence breach of contract. The question
offered at the trial of this case that now arises as to whether or not this
we are left nothing to add upon these variance between the pleading and
and content ourselves with offering proof is such a failure of proof as
authorities to support the questions will permit the court to direct a verof law as decided by the trial judge dict.
and now involved upon this appeal.
An established rule. of pleading is
These questions are set forth in this that a complaint must proceed upon
brief under numerals I, II, III, VI, some definite theory or on that
and V.
theory which the plaintiff must sucFraud, according to the authorities ceed or not succeed at all. Appellant's
is a tort. It is a civil wrong; an in- complaint proceeds upon a definite
jury inflicted otherwise than by a theory, that of fraud. His proof,
mere breach of contract. A case not however, only showed mere breach
precisely in point but in which this of contract. This variance, accordrule was cited is that of Shirk vs. ing to the highest court in this state
Mitchell, 137 Indiana 185.
The and leading decisions from other
learned judge in his decision said:
states, is material and a failure of
"The same transaction cannot be proof sufficient to permit the dismischaracterized as a warranty and a sal of the action.
fraud at the same time. A warranty
Three Indiana decisions are in
rests on contract while fraud or point on this question. In Brem-
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merman vs. Jennings, 101 Indiana,
the Supreme Court held:
"That a plaintiff can succeed upon
the case made by his complaint and
not upon a different one; his evidence
must prove the substance of the issue
tendered by his pleading or he will
fail no matter what else he may
prove."
The court in Armacost vs. Lindley, 116 Indiana 295, said:
"A party must stand or fall upon
the theory of his case as he presents
it in his pleadings. Recovery will
be upheld only when the evidence and
the facts found support the case
made by his complaint."
In Sanders vs. Hartge, 17 Indiana
Appellate 243, the Supreme Court in
discussing the same rule of law said:
"It is of the highest importance tc
the administration of the law that
courts should adhere most tenaciously and strictly to the rule of pleading
which requires the pleader to be
bound by his cause of action as stated
by him, as otherwise his adversary
could have no assurance of the facts
he would have to controvert to meet
his attacks and would be taken inaware in the forensic encounter at
the bar."
A New York case, Ross vs. Mather,
51 N. Y. 108, is directly in point.
There the complaint alleges that the
defendant on selling to the plaintiff
a horse which was lame, warranted
and falsely and fraudulently represented that the lameness was in his
foot and nowhere else, and would
soon be well; that the plaintiff relying upon such warranty and representations and believing them to be
true purchased the horse; that the
horse was not lame in his foot but
in his grambrel joint and was of little value which the defendant well

knew. The plaintiff proved the wars
ranty and breach thereof but gave
no evidence tending to prove fraud
or any intention to deceive. The
court held that the basis of the action
was fraud, not a breach of warranty
and that the plaintiff could not recover upon proof of the latter only.
In rendering this decision the courte
said:
"Where the complaint is for frauF
the general rule is that the plaintiff
cannot recover for a breach of contract. The law never intended that
a party who has failed in the performance of a contract merely should
be sued for a fraud or that a party
who had committed a fraud should be
sued for a breach of contract unlesf
the fraud was intended to be waived.
The two causes of action are entirely
distinct and there can be no recovery
as for a breach of contract where P
fraud is the basis of the complaint."
Jones on Evidence at page 29§
says:
"Where the proof fails to support
the allegations not in some particulars only but in their entire scope and
meaning, and if the divergence extends to such an important fact or
group of facts that the cause of action or defence as proved would be
another than that set up in the
pleadings it is not a variance but a
failure of proof which cannot be
cured by amendment and the action
must be dismissed."
Since the authorities are unanimous in supporting the rule that the
variance between a complaint sounding in tort and proof showing only q
mere breach of cQntract is material
and a sufficient failure of proof tc
warrant a direction of verdict, the
question now arises as to the power.
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authority and duty of the court tc
direct such verdict.
The power and authority of the
court to direct a verdict upon failure
of proof, that is, when the evidence
is deemed insufficient, is practically
absolute. Although such authority is
impliedly given by the very fact that
the existence of a material variance
and failure in proof is sufficient to
dismiss the action on trial, there are
many authorities expressly holding
that the court is vested with this authority and power.
Perhaps the foremost case on this
question is that of Griggs vs. Houston decided by the United States Supreme Court and reported in 104 U.
S. 552. This case is one in which
the plaintiff sued a contractor. The
court dismissed the case on the
ground that the statutes in relation
to railroads did not apply to a contractor engaged in building a road.
Upon appeal the Supreme Court held
that it was right and within the.
power of a court to direct a verdict
for the defendants where the evidence was insufficient to sustain
plaintiff's cause of action.
The court in Anthony vs. Wheeler,
130 Illinois 128, said:
"The jury may be instructed to
find for defendant when plaintiff has
failed to prove some material point
in his case."
In Corning vs. Troy Factory, 44
New York 577, the court said:
"If the facts proved clearly fail
either to establish a cause of action
or a defence as a matter of law, the
court may direct a verdict."
Pomeroy on Remedies at page 554
writing on cause of action based on
contract and tort says;
"These causes of action differ in
substance. One is upon contract and

the other in tort and the law will not
permit a recovery upon one by showing a right of recovery upon the
other."
According to some authorities not
alone is it the power and right of the
court to direct a verdict upon failure
of proof but it is the duty of the
court to so direct the jury.
In the leading case on this point.
that of the Metropolitan Railroad
Company vs. Moore decided by the
United States Supreme Court and'
reported in 121 U. S. 558, the court
said:
"If no evidence is offered or if it is
not such as one in reason and fairness could find from it the fact sought
to be established the court ought not
to submit the findings of such fact tc
the jury."
A New York case, Deyo against
New York Central Railroad Company, 33 N. Y. 9, likewise is in point,
There the court laid down the doctrine to be that if the evidence is not
sufficient to warrant a verdict or if
the court would set aside a verdict
if found, it is the duty of the court
to nonsuit a plaintiff.
Appellant in his argument on appeal lays much stress upon the scintilla of evidence rule. The rule as
set forth in his brief has no bearing
upon this case in that it is an expression of the old doctrine now
obsolete.
Jones on Evidence at page

-

says

regarding the present day attitude
of courts toward the scintilla of evidence rule:
"The recent decisions have completely exploded the old roctrine by
which a judge was compelled to submit the case to the jury if there was
a scintilla of evidence to support the
claim of the plaintiff. In place of
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this old rule has come the more reasonable one, that in every case there
is a preliminary question for the
judge whether there is evidence upon which the jury may properly proceed to find a verdict. When the evidence with all the inferences that the
jurs can justifiably draw from it is
insrfficient to support a verdict for
the plaintiff it is the duty of the
court to take the case from the jury
and to direct a verdict or grant a nonsuit as the facts of the case may warrant.
We might summarize the issues in
this appeal as they appear to the appellees as follows:
1. That fraud is a tort.
2. That breach of contract is not
a tort.

3. That plaintiff, now appellant,
failed in his proof when he alleged
fraud in his complaint and offered
evidence at the trial tending to prove
mere breach of contract.
4. That when such failure oi
proof exists the court has the right
and power, in fact is duty bound, tc
direct the verdict dismissing the action.
5. That the scintilla of evidence
rule has been replaced by the more
reasonable rule that in every case
there is a preliminary question for
the judge whether there is evidence
upon which the jury may properly
proceed to find a verdict.
There is no error in the record.
Respectfully submitted,
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NOTRE DAME CIRCUIT COURT
Record of Cases.
(Leo J. Ward)
is impanelled and the cause is submitted and the trial had.
Charles E. Duff, doing business as
The defendant tenders three in.
The Pioneer Stock Powder Co.
structions in writing which' are refused. The defendant excepts to the
VS.
court's ruling in refusing to give the
Samuel Koontz.
said instructions.
The defendant submits interrogaLeo J. Hassenhauer,
tories numbered one to seven inclusFrancis Walsh,
ive, which interrogatories are given
Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
as submitted.
Francis Walsh opens the argument
Clifford O'Sullivan,
for the plaintiff, followed by Clifford
William J. McGrath,
O'Sullivan for the defense. William
Attorneys for the Defendant.
J. McGrath closed the defendant's
argument and the plaintiff's case was
This is an action on a negotiable concluded by Leo J. Hassenauer.
instrument given by the defendant to
The court now instructs the jurN
the plaintiff, which note is due and in writing and files the instructions
unpaid. Demand $250.00.
and orders that they be made part of
The plaintiff files declaration in the record without bill of exceptions.
two paragraphs.
The jury retires and returns into
Defendant files general demurrei open court their general verdict in
to plaintiff's declaration. Demurrer favor of the defendant and against
sustained and plaintiff takes leave to the plaintiff.
file amended declaration.
The jury also returns the interPlaintiff files amended declaration rogatories and the answers thereto.
in two paragraphs: (1) on the note
The plaintiff files motion for a new
and (2) on the contract.
trial which motion the court overDefendant files plea in five para- rules, to which ruling the plaintiff
graphs:
(1) non est factum; (2) takes exception.
Judgment is rendered in favor of
breach of contract; (3) payment;
(4) failure of consideration; (5) par- the defendant and against the plaintiff.
tial failure and payment.
The plaintiff prays an appeal to
Plaintiff now files replication in
(1) similiter to the Supreme Court of Notre Dame,
three paragraphs:
defendants first paragraph of plea; which is granted and five days are
(2) confession and avoidance; (3) given in which to file a general bill
of exceptions. Ten days are given to
general traverse.
Defendant now files traverse to the said plaintiff in which to file an
the second and similter to the third appeal bond in the sum of $250.00
paragraphs of plaintiffs replication. which bond and sureties thereon are
The cause being at issue the jury hereby approved.
CAUSE NO. 8.
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and (2)
insufficiency. Demurrer
overruled.
Defendants file answer in general
James Wilson
denial.
VS.
Plaintiff files motion to strike out
part of defendants answer. Motion
Marion Biddle et al.
sustained and defendants separately
except.
Harry P. Nester,
Edwin Hunter,
The cause being at issue the jury
is impanelled and the cause is submitAttorneys for the Plaintiff.
ted to the jury for trial, and the trial
Joseph Patrick O'Hara,
is had.
Francis Clohessey,
The plaintiff tenders five instrucAttorneys for the Defendants.
tions in writing which are refused.
The plaintiff excepts to the ruling of
This is an action for damages for the court in refusing to give his inalleged fraudulent conduct in failing structions. Defendants tender perto convey land to the plaintiffs by emptory instruction.
the defendants under an agreement.
Harry P. Nester opens argument
Demand $1500.00.
for the plaintiffs followed by Joseph
The plaintiff files complaint pre- Patrick O'Hara for the defense.
sumably in- three paragraphs: (1) Francis J. Clohessy closed the argufraudulent transfer; (2) breach of ment for the defense and the case for
contract; (3) defrauding of benefits the plaintiff was concluded by Edwin
of contract.
W. Hunter.
Defendants file motion to separate
Court instructs the jury perempparagraphs of complaint. Motion torily to return a verdict for the desustained and complaint is separated fendants.
into three paragraphs and numberThe jury returns into open court
ed.
their general verdict in favor of the
Defendants file separate and sev- defendants and against the plaintiff.

CAUSE NO. 9.

eral motion to strike out parts of the
plaintiff's complaint as surplusage.
Motion sustained and matter striken
out.
Defendants file separate and several general demurrer to the complaint.
Defendant
Demurrer sustained.
takes leave to file an amended complaint.
Plaintiff files amended complaint
in one paragraph for fraud in depriving him of benefits of alleged contract.
Defendants file separate and several demurrer alleging, (1) misjoinder

The plaintiff files motion for new
trial which the court overrules, tc
which ruling the plaintiff excepts.
Judgment is rendered in favor of
the defendants and against the plaintiff.
The defendant prays an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Notre Dame,
which is granted and ten days are
given in which to file a general bill of
exceptions. Five days are given in
which to file an appeal bond in the
sum of $200.00 whcih bond and sureties thereon are hereby approved.
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CAUSE NO. 10.
William Hill
VS.
John Green et al.
Ralph Bergman,
Emmett Rohyans,
Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Maurice F. Smith,
Leo B. Ward,
Attorneys for the Defendants.
This is an action on a promissory
note given by the defendants and
negotiated to the plaintiff, which note
is due and unpaid; demand $210.66.
The plaintiff files complaint in one
paragraph on the note.
Defendants file separate and several answer in four paragraphs: (1.)
general denial; (2) Breach of warranty; (3) fraudulent negotiation tc
avoid defenses; (4) separate defense
of no consideration for suretyship of
Daniel Walker.
The plaintiff files a general and
several demurrer to each of the
second, third and fourth paragraphs
of answer. Demurrer overruled -as
to the second and third paragraphs
of answer. Demurrer sustained as
to the fourth paragraph of answer.
The defendant, Daniel Walker,
files cross-complaint in one paragraph against William Hill and John
Green to be adjudged a surety on the
note.
The plaintiff William Hill and the
defendant John Green file general denials to the cross-complaint.
The case being at issue the jury i-v
impanelled and the cause submitted
and the trial had.
The plaintiff tenders four instructions in writing which instructions
are refused.

The plaintiff takes exception to the
ruling of the court in refusing the
instructions. The defendant tenders
15 instructions all of which are refused except numbers two, three and
six. The defendant takes exception
to the courts ruling in refusing to
give each and all of his instructions.
The plaintiff submits interrogatories numbered from one to five inclusive, all of which are submitted by
the court.
The defendants submit interrogatories numbered from one to nine inclusive, all of which are submitted
by the court except number two.
Ralph Bergman opens the argu.
ment for the plaintiff and is followed
by Marrice Smith for the defendants. The defendants argument is
closed by Leo B. Ward and Emmett
Rohyans concludes the argument for
the plaintiff.
The. court now instructs the jury
in writing and files the instructions
and orders that they be made a part
of the record without bill of exceptions.
The jury retires and returns intc
open court their general verdict in
favor of the plaintiff for $212.00
against John Green as principal and
Daniel Walker as surety.
The jury also returns the interrogatories and answers thereto.
The defendants file motion for new
trial which motion is overruled by
the court, to which ruling the defendants separately take exception.
Judgment is rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against John Green,
principal, and Daniel Walker, surety.
in the sum of $212.00.
The defendant prays an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Notre Dame,
which appeal is granted and ten days
-are given in which to file a general
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refuses all but numbers one and two.
Delbert D. Smith opens the argument for the plaintiff, followed by
Francis Murphy for the defendant.
Walter Miller closed the argument
for the defense and Edward P. Madigan concluded the case for the plainCAUSE NO. 11.
tiff.
The court now instructs the jury
The First National Bank of Chicago
in writing and files the instructions
VS.
The St. Joseph Loan and Trust Co. and orders that they be made part of
the record without bill of exceptions.
The jury retires and returns into
Edward P. Madigan and
court the general verdict in faopen
Smith,
Delbert D.
the plaintiff fixing damages in
of
vor
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
of $1000.00.
sum
the
Francis J. Murphy and
also return the interrogajury
The
Walter R. Miller,
answers thereto.
the
and
tories
Attorneys for Defendant.
files motion for new
defendant
The
court overrules, to
the
which
This is an action on two checks trial
defendant takes exthe
each for $500.00, drawn on the which ruling
Mishawaka National Bank and trans- ception.
Judgment is rendered in 'favor oferred to the defendant bank for colplaintiff in the sum of $1000.00
the
lection, demand $1000.00.
defendant prays an appeal tc
The
Complaint in one paragraph for
Court of Notre Dame
Supreme
the
money had and received on checks.
and ten days are
is
granted
which
Defendant files answer in two parageneral bill o '
to
file
which
in
given
general denial; (2)
(1)
graphs:
are given tdays
Five
exceptions.
confession and avoidance.
to file an apwhich
in
defendant
said
Plaintiff files motion to strike out
of $1000.00,
sum
the
in
bond
peal
defendant's second paragraph of
thereon are
sureties
and
bond
which
answer. Motion sustained and deapproved.
hereby
fendant excepts.
bill of exceptions. Five days are
given to the said defendant in which
to file an appeal bond in the sum of
$200.00, which bond and the sureties
thereon are hereby approved.

The cause being at issue, the jury
is impanelled, the cause submitted
and the trial had.
The plaintiff tenders two instructions in writing which are refused.
Defendant tenders four instructions
in writing which are refused. Plaintiff excepts to courts ruling in refus.
ing to give his instructions tendered.
Defendant excepts to courts ruling
in refusing to give his instructions
tendered.
The defendant submits interrogatories. numbered I to 5. The court

CAUSE NO. 12.
(junior Division)
George D. O'Brien and Clyde Walsh,
partners as O'Brien & Walsh
VS.
Charles M. Dunn
Alden J. Cusick and

Joseph H. Flick,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
James L. O'Toole and
Frank Francescovich,
Attorneys for Defendant.
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Action on account for legal services
rendered, demand $100.00.
Plaintiff files complaint on account,
with bill of particulars attached.
Defendant files demurrer to complaint for want of facts. Court overrules demurrer to which ruling defendant excepts.
Defendant files answer in three
paragraphs: (1) general denial; (2)
Payment; (3) Accord and satisfaction.
Plaintiff files motion to require defendant to elect between alleged inMotion overconsistent defences.
ruled to which ruling plaintiff excepts.
Plaintiff files reply to the 2nd and
3rd paragraphs of answer.

Defendant filed demurrer to the
reply which the court overrules, the
defendant excepting.
Jury is waived and the cause is
submitted to the court for trial and
the trial concluded.
Joseph H. Flick opens the argument for plaintiff, followed by Frank
Francesovich for the defendant.
James L. O'Toole concludes the argument for defendant and Alden J. Cusick closes for plaintiff.
Court finds for the defendant upon
the 3rd paragraph of answer, accord
and satisfaction, and against the
plaintiff, that plaintiff take nothing
by his action and that defendant recover his costs.
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JUNIOR MOOT COURT
Cases Reported.
(Chas. J. Mooney)
CAUSE NO. 5
Andrew White and Samuel Small,
Partners as White & Small
VS.
Andrew Johnson
Andrew Johnson, the defendant,
in writing authorized the real estate
firm of White & Small, plaintiffs, to
sell a certain tract of real estate for
him at a stated price and on certain
terms also stated. The plaintiffs,
pursuant to such written authority,
entered into a written contract with
Whitcomb & Kellar for the sale of defendant's said real estate. Plaintiff
executed said contract of sale as
agents for the defendant, referring
to themselves as agents in the body
of the contract and signing themselves as agents.
The sale thus contracted for, however, was so different in character of
price and terms and conditions from
the sale the defendant had authorized plaintiffs to make, that he refused
to close the deal as thus mase and
ref usen longer to recognize the plaintiffs as agents and in fact discharged
them by letter expressly revoking
the agency. Later the defendant
and Whitcomb & Keller got together
and closed the deal and carried out
the hontralt on the terms and conditions as stated therein.
Plaintiff demanded a commission
from defendant which was refused on
the ground that plaintiffs acted wholly outside their authority in entering
into such a contract of sale, that he,
defendant, had refused to recognize
their action in making such a contract, had in fact discharged them.

and was not liable to the mfor anything he did subsequently, being free
to contract and transact for himself
in the sale of his land.
Should plaintiffs recover or not
and why?
Archibold Duncan and
Lewis L. Van Dyke
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Charles M. Dunn and
Edward J. Meagher,
Attorneys for Defendant.
PLAINTIFFS' POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES
The plaintiff contends in this case
that he was the procuring cause of
the sale and therefore entitled to
compensation for his services from
defendant.
The general rule is that a broker
has performed his contract and is
entitled to his compensation when he
is the procuring cause of the sale affected with the purchaser, and the
rule is the same event though the sale
is affected by the owner himself.
In the case of Hoadley v. Savings
Bank of Danbury, 44 L. R. A. 321,
the broker merely called a person's
attention to a certain piece of property, and gave him information as to
how to obtain admission thereto.
Later the owner, without the broker's
knowledge, took up the negotiation
and completed the sale. Here the
Conn. court held the broker the procuring cause, and was entitled to
compensation.
Also in the case of Platt v. John, 9
Ind. App. 58. the same proposition
was applied. In this case the broker
secured a prospective buyer and introduced him to his employer, which
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does not entitle the broker to his- commission. Vol. 4 Amer. & English Law
2d. Ed. 978. Then in Crook et al. vs.
Forest, Ala. 1897 22 So. 540 It was
held in the opinion that a land owner
The following citations support by employing a broker does not bar
this general proposition 62 Mich. 543. his right to sell the land if he does it
93 Am. Dec. 718. 22 Am. Dec. 441.
in a fair and honest way and' if he
"Mechan" on this proposition says: notifies his agent before the sale is
"If an agent has done all that he un- completpetd, further an agent cannot
dertook to do, he is entitled to com- recover for a commission if he does
pensation, even though the principal not procure a party ready, willing
receihed no benefits, or failed or re- and able to buy on the terms and
fused to avail himself of the advan- price made by the principal. These
tages secured. Thus a broker em- two authorities show that the defendployed to effect a sale of property is ant in our case was entitled to revoke
entitled to compensation when he has the agency which he did with a letter
found a purchaser ready, willing and and sell the land to the customer if
able to buy on the proposed terms, does so with no intention of defraudeven though the principal does not, ing the agent and there is no such
or cannot through defective title or fraud alleged in the case before th,court. To support this contentior
otherwise complete the sale."
further Mecham on Agency says pp.
964-9666: "The broker must show
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND
he can recover commission,
before
AUTHORITIES
that he has completed his undertak1. An agency not coupled with an ing according to its terms, or that its
interest may be revoked at any time. completion was prevented without
John Alexander et al vs. Sherwood his fault by the principal. What conCo. 77 S. E. 1027. This principle stitutes a completion, however, is a
shows that the defendant may dis- question of no little difficulty in many
charge the broker at anytime since cases, depending as it does upon vathe broker is not coupled with an in- gue and indefinite agreements between the parties. The duty of the
terest.
performed when he has
2. If the broker attempts unsuc- broker is
procured a purchaser ready, willing
cessfully to effect a sale and his proto purchase upon the terms
posed purchaser abandons the idea and able
or if no particular terms
specified
of buying but is afterwards induced
upon, when he procurep a
are
agreed
to do so by the principal or by anothto whom the principal
purchaser
er person without being in any way
may be seen in our case
As
sells."
induced by the broker, the latter is
were specified and the
terms
the
not entitled to his commission. So
to procure a purunable
was
agent
where the broker has had a reasonato purchase at
able
was
who
chaser
ble time in which to affect a sale and
and therefor
upon
agreed
price
the
does not do so the principal may complete the sale and the fact that the was discharged by a letter giving
sale is made to the same customer him actual notice of his dismissal.
resulted in a sale between them.
Here the Indiana Supreme Court
said he was the "procuring cause"
and entitled to compensation.
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CAUSE NO. 6
Mary Hardesty
VS.
Anna Jamison
Action for Damages for Alleged
Assault and Battery.
Demand $500.
Mrs. Anna Jamison, the defendant,
was the owner of a number of tenement flats which she rented, located
in the City of South Bend. For more
than a year her husband collected
the rents and accounted to her for
them, and during this year the plaintiff had been a tenant of Mrs. Jamison and had paid the rent to Mr.
Jamison.
On August 15, 1919, Mrs. Jamison
took from her husband the authority
to collect these rents, intending tc
appoint a firm of real estate agents
to collect her rents thereafter. On
September 1st, following, Mr. Jamison, notwithstanding the revocation
of his authority to do so, called as
usual to collect the rent from Mrs.
Mrs. Hardesty repreHardesty.
sented at the time that she was unable to pay the rent; because of her
refusal or inability to pay Mr. Jamison became quarrelsome and in fact
struck Mrs. Hardesty several times
in the face.
For this assault and battery Mrs.
Hardesty brings action against Mrs.
Jamison. Mrs. Jamison knew nothing about her husband's attempt to
collect the rent on this occasion and,
after learning of it, immediately
communicated to Mrs. Hardesty the
fact that she had prior to the difficulty with her husband taken from him
all authority to collect the rents, by
expressly forbidding him to collect
the rents September and thereafter.
Who should recover?

Clyde A. Walsh and
Henry W. Fritz,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
James K. O'Toole anh
Francis Franciscovich,
Attorneys for Defendants.
PLAINTIFF'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES
A married woman may appoint an
Agent and her husband may be so
appointed: Section 48 Mechem on
Agency "Where a married woman is
competent to act by Agent her husband may be appointed as the
Agent." Case of Shane v Lyons
(1898) 172 Mass. 199-51 N. E. 976,
70 Am. St. Rep. 261.
Court said in this case: "We see
no reason for regarding her as incapable of authorizing any act to be
done by him in her name, and her
behalf, or for shielding her from responsibility."
Married woman as principal-it
is now a settled principal of law that
a married woman may be a principal
and appoint her agent. Mechem on
Agency Section 42. Statutes in most
states have removed the common law
disability for married women and
she is clothed with the power to
manage to her own affairs, and certainly the power to appoint an agent
or attorney to do that which she is
capable of doing in person.
Notice of Revocation-upon revoking the authority of a general agent,
the principal must give notice of revocation to persons who have had
previous dealings with the agent as
such, or he will continue to be bound
by agent's acts.
The notice must be actual-and
must be extended to those who have
extended credit in reliance upon the
authority and general public notice
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to others. Mechem on Agency. Section 117.
Court in Diversity v Kellog 114
Ill. Reports says: "Where a party is
shown to have been the agent of another in a particular business or continues to so act within the scope of
his former authority it will be presumed that his authority still continues, and will bind his principal unless
the persons with whom he'acts have
been notified that his agency has
ceased.
Burns Revised Statutes. Section
5120 (1882) Removes the common
law disability of married woman in
this state and allows a married woman to contract, appoint an agent.
Principals liability for Tort of
Agent-Mechem on Agency Sec. 98Both principal and agent are liable
for tort committed in scope of his
authority.
In the case of Bergman v Hendrickson 81 N. W. 304 The court said
that if the assault was committed for
the purpose of compelling payment
the servant was acting within the
scope of his employment and the
master was liable for plaintiff's injuries, though he may never have au-:
thorized such method of collection
and may have expressly probited it.
Mechem on Agency page 135 Sec.
253 says: "The older cases hold the
principal not liable to third persons
for the agent's wilful and malicious
acts, but the modern rule is that he is
liable for these also if the agent committed them while he was acting in
the execution of his agency and within the scope of his authority.
Cases supporting this: Singer Mfg.
Co. v Rahn 132 U. S. 518. Southern
Express Co. v Brown Am. St. Rep.
306 (67 Miss. 260).
In 90 N. Y. 77 Judge Earle says:

"It matters not that he exceeded the
powers conferred on him by his principal and that he did an act which
the principal was not authorized to
do so long as he acted in scope of authority and line of duty, or being engaged in the service of the defendant,
attempted to perform a duty pertaining which he believed to that service.
In 116 Ill. App. 80 the Court held
that principal was liable for assault
of agent in attempting to collect an
installment due on furniture sold by
the principal to the complainant.
Supporting this C. B. & Q. R. R. v
Bryan 90 Ill. 126.
Vol. 21 R. C. L. page 846- A duty
rests upon every man in the management of his own affairs whether by
himself or by his agents or servants
so to conduct them as not to injure
another, and that if he does not do so,
and another is thereby injured, he
shall answer for the damage. 1 Atl
709-91 Am. Dec. 425.
Page 94 Cyc. of Law Vol. 5. It is
sufficient to make the master liable if
the wrongful act of the servant was
committed in the business of the master, and within the scope of his employment, even if he departed from
the instruction of the master.
It is an old rule of law that "where
one of two innocent persons must
suffer for acts of another, the person
who caused or set in motion the
agency will be held liable.
Case of 109 Fed. 369-45 N. Y. 54971 N. W. 427-44 Iowa 318-7 N. W.
368.
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES
The doctrine that in order that the
principal not be bound by the acts
of an agent whose authority has been
revoked, notice must be given to
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third parties, has no application in
this case.
"The doctrine
20 N. W. 476 ....
that a discharged agent can bind his
principal to the extent of the authority with which he was apparently
clothed has no application beyond
the claims of the agent."
Even if the authority of the agent
had not been revoked, this principal
would not be liable for the assault.
There is a clear-cut distinction between torts of the agent which are
merely negligent and unskillful and
those which are in themselves malicious, intentional and unlawful.
McManus vs. Cricket (1 East
160) . . . . "When a servant quits
sight of the object for which he was
employed, and without having in
view his master's orders, pursues
that which his own malice suggests,
he is no longer acting in the pursuanse of the authority given him
and his master is not liable for sulh
act."
It is clearly beyond the authority
of an agent who has the mere authority to collect rents, to assault and
batter a tenant.
82 S. W. 552 .... "The defenhant
is not liable for the assault of his collecting agent upon the plaintiff, the
agent in so hoing not being about his
master's business and not acting
within any authority delegated to
him by the master. To assault and
beat a creditor is not a recognized or
usual means resorted to lor the collection of a debt nor is it one calculated to bring about a settlement."
137 Pac. 428 .... "A merchant is
not liable for the act of his general
canager authorized to collect for
goods sold and to recover goods
wrongfully taken, in assaulting a cust)mer to whom he has gone to collect

for goods which he claims were taken by the customer."
56 Hun. 506 .... "A drayman sent
by the purchaser to get some goods
from the warehouse of the defendant
objected to receiving certain damaged packages and was assaulted by
the employe of the defendant who
was sent by the defendant to superintend the loading of the goods. It
was held that the defendant was not
liable for the assault as the employe
was acting outside the scope of his
authority.
CAUSE NO. 7
Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago
St. Louis Railroad Company
vs
John Hamilton
Action for
Subscription.

Collection

of

&

Stock

FACTS
Defendant signed and delivered to
the plaintiff's agent, the following
written instrument:
"We, the undersigned, agreed to
pay fifty dollars ($50) for each
share of stock stated and annexed to
our names, to be paid in installments
of 5 per cent levied every sixty days
by the Board of Directors of the
Company. No assessment is to be
made till the subscriptions amount to
the sum of $600,000. The railroad
is to be constructed within a mile of
the subscriber's place."
Defendant signed and opposite his
name set "50 shares."
The $600,000 was later fully subscribed and the Board of Directors
levied the assessments upon the subscribers to be paid every sixty days.
The defendant refused to pay his subscriptions, because, as the facts are,
John Doe, the company's agent who
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solicited the subscription and to
whom the paper was delivered, before and at the time of the signing
of the subscription, stated to defendant that defendant would not be required to pay any money on his subscription till the railroad was builttill the road was constructed and,
worked in that county; that the road
had not been constructed in that
county; .that he, the defendant, relied upon the statements of the company's agent thus made and signed
and delivered the instrument in action on the belief that no money
would have to be paid thereon till the
i-oad was constructed; that he, defendant, was induced by such statement to make the subscription and
that, but for such representation of
the company's agent, he would not
have signed the instrument; that this
fraud of the agent procured the subscription, and that, therefore, plaintiff should not recover on the subscription in action.
Donnelly C. Langston and
George D. O'Brien,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Alden J. Cusick and
Joseph I. Flick,
Attorneys for Defendant.
PLAINTIFF'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITY
(Indiana Rule). It is a general
rule that extrinsic or parole evidence
is not admissable to contradict, vary,
add to, substract from, or otherwise
modify the terms of a written instrument. 17 L. R. A. 273; 6 L. R. A. 33;
6 Ind. 656.
Quotation from Wigmore, Vol. 4.
Par. 2439: "It may be added that the
term 'fraud' must here be understood
in its legitimate, narrow sense, i. e.,
a misrepresentation of a past or

present fact; for, although a much
looser significance has been occasionally intimated, yet it is obvious that
an intent not to perform a promise
(i. e., a misrepresentation as to a future fact), or a subsequent failure
knowingly to perform an extrinsic
agreement not embodied in the writing, cannot be included in the term
'fraud.' It seems to be a disregard.
for this distinction that is in part responsible for the anomalous attitudc
of the Pennsylvania court towards
the general rule."
Referring to the foregoing quotation 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 434, says:
"The only cases which have been disclosed holding that fraud of this gind
is sufficient to warrant the allowance
of parole evidence are those of Pennsylvania."
Where a man, who can without difficulty read, executes a paper without
reading it, trusting to the party to
whom it is executetd for a statement
of its contents, or trusting to the
reading of it by the latter, there being no substantial reason shown for
not reading it himself, he will be
guilty of negligence. (37 L. R. A.)
64 Ind. 120; 73 Ind. 198; 106 Ind.
406.
Thornburgh vs. Newcastle & DanVille R. R. Co. (14 Ind. 6) "Reliance
cannot be placed upon the statements
of a soliciting agent for stock of a
railroad company, that the terms of
the subscription, that the subscriber
is asked to sign, provided for payment in money or supplies."
The foregoing citation presents the
attitude taken by the courts of this
state, as regards the contracts made
by the soliciting agent of a railroad.
It presents the court's attitude as to
contemporaneous oral agreements
and the rule in this state, as to the
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introduction of such agreements is

clearly stated in 121 Ind. 6. "Evidence of prior or contemporaneous
agreement is not admissable to contradict, or vary the terms of a written instrument or contract."
According to Hughes on Evidence,
Page 238, it is conclusively presumed that all extrinsic or parole agreements have been merged into the one
written contract of the parties. Since
this is a conclusive presumption, parole may not be introduced to in any
way change the written contract.
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES
1. Fraud is a false representation
of fact, made with a knowledge that
it is false, or in reckless disregard as
to whether it is true or false, made
with an intention that it should be
acted upon, and actually inducing one
to act thereon to his damage. Anson
on Contracts 199.
(a) Corporation liable for representations of its agent selling stock
Fifth Ave. Bank v Ferry Co. 19 L.
R. A. 331; Jewett v Valley R. Co. 34
Ohio 601.
(b) If corporation seeks to enforce
subscription obtained by promoter,
it will be bound by fraudulent representations made by the promoter to
induce the subscription. McDermott
v Harrison 30 N. Y. 324.
2. Nothing indefinite or suspicious
about agent's statement and defendant was not bound to investigate.
(a) Uarole evidence is admissable
to prove fraud induced the giving of
the subscription. Haynes v Moore
17 L. R. A. 272; 6 L. R. A. 45.
(b) The mere fact that the contract is reduced to writing will not
prevent its being set aside for fraud
in procuring it. Boyce v Grundy 28
U. S. (Pet.) 120

(c) Whether the representation is
of opinion or of fact is a question to
be decided by the jury and not by the
court. Banta v Savage 12 Nev. 151.
3. Opinion cannot be relied upon
unless so made as to intentionally deceive by putting the person off his
guard and inducing him to act on it.
Jackson C Collins 30 Mich. 557.
(b) If the false statements are of
matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the person making them and
are affirmations of fact, the other
party has a right to rely on them.
Rouer v Truant 83 Va. 397-54 Am.
Rep. 60.
(c) Case in point. Statements made
concerning the happening of a future
event cannot be relied on to avoid a
subscription obtained by an agent,
unless they are made fraudulently,
with an intention to deceive. Jefferson v Hewitt 95 Cal. 535; Armstrong
v Karshner 47 Ohio 276.
CAUSE NO. 8.
Alfred Whitaker
vs
George Swanson
Action for Damages, $1000, for injuries due to Defendant's alleged
negligent driving of his automobile
into plaintiff.
Plaintiff, while crossing the street
in South Bend, was struck by the
automobile of defendant driven at
the time by the defendant himself.
Defendant crossed the street without
obtaining the traffic policeman's signal or leave to cross, and while thus
crossing and without warning, ran
into plaintiff, causing injuries which
occasioned doctor and hospital bills,
loss of time from work, to the extent
of $200.
After the injury the plaintiff met
and settled their case in this manner:
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defendant agreed to give to plaintiff
his certain described horse and buggy
which plaintiff then and there agreed
to accept in full settlement and compromise of the plaintiff's right of
action against defendant.
Despite the fact of this agreement
in settlement, plaintiff brings this
action and defendant seeks to bar
the action by pleading the agreement
in settlement set out.
Gerald Craugh and
William S. Allen,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Joseph Sanford and
Frank 'Coughlin,
Attorneys for Defendant.
PLAINTIFF'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES.
The right 'of plaintiff to recover
damages for injury.
24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 557, Kentucky.
50 So. 449, Louisiana.
188 S. W. 638, Kentucky.
The facts show accofd without
satisfaction which cannot constitute
settlement.
Buchart v. Barger, 114 Ind. 55317 N. E. 125.
McKeon v. Reed-12 Am. Dec. 319
-Kentucky.
Young v. Jones-18 Am. Rep. 279
-Maine.
Russell v. Lytle-22 Am. Dec. 537
-New York.
Brooklyn Bank. DeGrauw et al.
35 Am. Dec. 569 New York.
Hoxie v. Empire Lumber Co.-41
Minn. 548.
Also the following decisions sustaining the above proposition.
97 S. E. 90.
45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062.
77 Atl. 874.
159 N. W. 717.
171 S. W. 939.
155 Pac. 246.
114 Pac. 1106.
Accord and Satisfaction defined as
an executed agreement.

Bully. Bull -43 Conn. 455.
Continental Gin Co. et al. v. Arnold, 153 Pac. 160-Okla.
Must put in statu quo, then can recover5 R. C. L. 899.
Swan v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co.-168
N. W. 659. North Dakota.
Accord without satisfaction only a
bar where so stipulated.
Binder v. Altman, 210 Ill. App. 237.
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES.
The rule that a promise to do another thing is not a satisfaction is
subject to the qualification that where
the parties agree that the new promise shall itself be a satisfaction of
the prior debt or duty and the new
agreement is based upon a good consideration and is accepted in satisfaction-then it operates as such and
bars the action.
Goodrich vs. Stanley-24 Conn.
613 holds that an acceptance of a new
and valid promise which can be enforced in substitution of an existing
claim may be as effectual a satisfaction and extinguishment of such
claim as the acceptance of any other
thing. Cases.
Smith vs. Elrod 24 So. 994.
Allison vs. Abendroth 15 N. E.
606.
Nassay vs. Tomilson 42 N. E. 715.
Langhead vs. Frich Coke Co. 58
A new promise is evident in this
Atl. 685.
case. Whitaker agreed to the promise made by Swanson (my client)
whereby he would give up his right
of action to sue for damages upon
the new agreement to accept a horse
and buggy in compromise.
Other cases.
Munley vs .Vermont Mut. Ins. Co.
62 Atl. 1020.
Palmer vs. Yager, 20 Wis. 91.
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CRIMINAL

PRACTICE

COURT

(Harry E. Denny)
Be It Remembered, That at the Proceedings of the Grand Jury:
February Term, 1920, of the Criminal Practice Court of Notre Dame,
Joseph Doran and
the sophomore lawyers of the College
Harry E. Denny and
of Law practising therein, the followMark Storen,
ing record was made:
Prosecuting Attorneys.
Bernard
V. Pater and
Court convened pursuant to law
Aaron
H.
Huguenard,
with the regular judge and officers
Attorneys for Defendants.
in attendance, namely: Judge, Francis J. Vurpillat; Clerk, Arthur C.
Upon the issuing and service of a
Keeney; Sheriff, Frank M. Hughes.
The following proceedings were had grand jury subpoena the following
witnesses were examined before the
and orders made, to-wit:
In re Jury Commissioners: The
court appointed as Jury Commissioners for the year 1920 E. M. Kennedy,
J. F. Heffernan, two resident householders of Notre Dame, Indiana,
and legal voters therein, good
and lawful men, known to be of opposite political party affiliations.
Come now the said appointees and
qualify as such jury commissioners
by taking and subscribing the oath
as such.
In re Grand Jury: The Jury Commissioners, including the Clerk of the
court, ex-officio, having met pursuant
to law in the discharge of their
duties, come now into court and report their action, to-wit: the selection in manner and form as prescribed by law of the following nabed persons as Grand Jurors, for the February Term, 1920, of this court:
Clyde Walsh,
Charles B. Foley,
Joseph Farley,
Fred B. Dressel,
Clarence B. Smith,
Kenneth F. Nyhan,
good and lawful men, householders
and legal voters of Notre Dame
Indiana.

grand jury, to-wit: Edwin J. McCarthy, Charles E. Butterworth,
William A. Miner, Paul V. Paden,
Eugene M. Kennedy, Alfonso A.
Scott, Charles M. Dunn.
The following is the state of facts
evidenced by the testimony introduced before the grand jury: Jack
Johnson and John Smith planned to
break into the house of Ben Franklin
for what they might find. On the
evening of June 1, 1919, they went to
the home of Ben Franklin. Johnson
stood outside on guard while Smith
went to the house and tried the door.
Just as Smith was about to insert a
skeleton key in the door lock, Mrs.
Franklin opened the door, shrieked
with fright and fled through the
house and out at the back door.
Smith immediately entered the
house and took a watch and chain
from the table. At that moment
Johnson gave a warning from outside and Smith ran from the house,
taking with him the watch and chain
and he and Johnson ran down the
street together.
The next evening they went to the
house of John Brown, telling him
how they got the watch and chain
and asked him to assist them in dis-
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posing of them. Brown took the
watch and chain and two days later
the three men went to the pawn shop
of Ike O'Brien in Misawaka and
there pawned the watch and chain.
The watch was a Boss filled gold
case with an H. H. Taylor movement
inside and a gold chain attached.
worth twenty-six dollars and belonged to Mr. Ben Franklin.
The grand jury returned into open
court their indictment based on this
state of facts, charging John Smith
with larcency in the first count, Jack
Johnson with larcency in the second
count and John Brown with receiving stolen goods in the third count.
The court, on motion of the prosecuting attorneys, ordered the clerk to
issue bench warrant for the immediate arrest of the defendants.
Comes the Sheriff into open court
with the three defendants named under arrest and makes return of his
warrant.
The three defendants by their attorneys above named moved separately and severally to quash each count
of the indictment on the following
grounds stated: 1st, for misjoinder
of count three against John Brown
for receiving stolen goods with
counts one and two against Smith
and Johnson for larcency; 2nd, for

insufficient facts alleged to constitute
a crime against the defendants or any
of them.
After argument upon the motion
to quash, the court sustained the motion and the indictment was quashed.
The defendants, however, were not
discharged, but the grand jury was
recalled and the cases again submitted to them, and after deliberation,
the grand jury returned into open
court their second indictments in the
cases, to-wit: one indictment in one
count against John Smith and Jack
Johnson charging them jointly with
the crime of larcency; and the second
indictment in one count charging
John Brown with the crime of receiving stolen goods. A motion to
quash was made in behalf of defendants John Smith and Jack Johnson
which was overruled, and to which
ruling the defendants separately excepted.
The case was submitted tn the jury
(class) for trial upon the above facts
assumed as proven. The arguments
were made, by the attorneys above
named and the jury retired to deliberate upon the case and arrive at
their cerdict.
The case against defendant John
Brown for receiving stolen goods was
continued.
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ONLY

OUR

OWN

OPINION

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS.
(Validity of Conscription Act)*
by
Francis J. Vurpillat.
"NOTE: This paper was read before The Round Table of South Bend, Indiana,
and before the classes in constitutional law prior to the rendition of the decision by
the United States Supreme Court, sustaining the Conscription Act.

The paper is

here presented in its original form, by request, on account of its controversial character and legal-brief style, the subject-matter of constitutional law and war powers
being ever new to students of the law.
The subject, the validity of the the Supreme Court of the United
Conscription Act, necessarily pre- States that "The only Government of
sents a legal question. But it is at this country which other nations
once a question intensely interesting recognize or treat with is the Governto the layman as well as to the law- ment of the Union, and the only
yer, because of its vital importance American Flag known throughout the
to the nation in this world-war crisis, world is the Flag of the United
to the General Government in its States." Fong Yue Ting vs. U. S.
powers to cope with an unscrupulous 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016-37 L. Ed. 905.
and dangerous enemy, to all the citi- The United States, therefore, poszens in their rights and conditions sesses the character of a sovereign
affected, and especially to the mil- nation. The Constitution confides tc
lions of young Americans who must the General Government plenary conanswer their country's call to serve trol over all foreign relations. A
as soldiers and, if need be, die in this large measure of the internal soverunprecedented war on foreign battle- eignty or local government is left
to the states, subject, however, to the
fields.
That we may clearly understand the express provision in the Constitution
points for and against the Conscrip- itself that this Constitution and the
tion Act we must keep in mind the laws and treaties made pursuant
peculiar nature of our government, thereto "shall be the supreme law of
national and state, and its constitu- the land."
We come now to consider whether
tional history. Under the Articles of
Confederation, before the adoption of the United States as a sovereign nathe Constitution, the states were tion, under the Constitution, has th
sovereign, completely independent power to enact the Conscription Act,
and bound together only by a league. which shall operate as the supreme
But as stated by Chief Justice Mar- law of the land, binding upon all the
shall, in McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 citizens of the country even those
Wheat. 316-4 L. Ed. 579, "'in order who are for the time serving as memto form a more perfect union', it was bers of the State militia. True it is
deemed necessary to change this al- that the Federal Government has only
liance into an effective government, such powers as are expressly or by
possessing great and sovereign pow- necessary implication granted to it
ers." By the adoption of the Con- by the Constitution, and that all
stitution national sovereignty passed powers not so granted to the General
from the States to the United States. Government are reserved to the
nation and government. It is said by States and the people. But what is
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the rule of constitutional construction
that must be applied in determining
the powers of the United States?
In construing the commerce clause
of the Constitution in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1-6 L. Ed.
23, Chief Justice Marshall laid down
the rule of construction which has
ever since been adhered to. The
Chief Justice said: "This instrument
contains an enumeration of powers
granted by the people to their government. It has been said that these
powers ought to be construed strictly.
But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the
Constitution which gives countenance
to this rule? . . . What do the gentlemen mean by a strict construction?
. . . If they contend for that narrow
construction which, in support of
some theory not to be found in the
constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the
words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction which would cripple
the government, and render it unequal to the objects for which it is
declared to be instituted, and to which
the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent; then we
cannot perceive the propriety of this
strict construction, nor adopt it as
the rule by which the Constitution is
to be expounded. . . . We know of'no
rule for construing the extent of
such powers, other than is given by
the language of the instrument which
confers them, taken in connection
with the purposes for which they
were conferred."
This opinion of Chief Justice Marshall and the rule of construction
here stated, we would respectfully

urge upon the consideration of the
gentlemen who would cripple the national government in th defeat of
the Conscription Act by means of thai
strict and narrow construction of the
Constitution which is here so vigorously condemned.
In the absence of any express'grant
of power to Congress to declare war
and to raise and maintain armies by
any means it may deem necessary and
proper, we submit that such power
exists as a necessary attribute to
sovereignty, and must be construed
to have been conferred by the very
act of the creation of the United
States Government in the adoption of
the Constitution. Self preservation
is not only the first law of nature,
but of nations as well. To make war
and -peace with other nations is universally recognized as a legitimate
exercise of external sovereignty; and
this power necessarily implies the
power to raise and maintain armies
and navies to that end by any means
that the sovereign power may adopt.
Speaking of the Louisiana purchase
and the acquisition of Florida and
Alaska, Black, in his work on Constitutional Law, says: "The power cannot be derived from any narrow or
technical interpretation of the Constitution. But it is necessary to
recognize that there is in this country a national sovereignty. That being conceded, it easily follows that
the right to acquire territory is incidental to this sovereignty. It is in
effect a resulting power, growing
iecessarily out of the aggregate of
powers delegated to the national
government by the Constitution."
If sovereignty in itself be not sufficient to sustain the Conscription Act
as a war measure of the United
States, it must, however, exert a
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strong influence in the construction
to be put upon the enumerated war
powers granted to Congress by Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution,
which are as follows:
To declare war, grant letters of
marque and reprisal and make rules
concerning captures on land and
water;
To raise and support armies; (appropriations therefor to be made for
two years at a time) ;
To provide and maintain a navy;
To make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval
forces;
To provide for calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the
Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming
and disciplining the militia and for
governing such part of them as may
be employed in the service of the
United States.
These powers are expressly granted, are absolute and without any limitation or restriction whatever as to
the means by which they may be exercised. And to these powers must
be added the provision that "the
President shall be the commander in
chief of the army and navy of the
United States and the militia of the
several states when called into the
actual service of the United States," a
provision which VonHolst's Constitutional Law declares, invests the president, as such commander, with all the
power which the King of England enjoyed as the commander of the land
and naval forces of the United Kingdom.
Concerning these war powers it is
said in Black's Constitutional Law
that "the power to declare war necessarily includes the authority to prose-

cute the war, and make it effective,
by all and any means, and in every
manner, known to and exercised by
any independent nation under the
rules and laws of war as the same arc
ascertained by the principles of international law. Justice Field, in the
case of Miller vs. United States II
Wall. 268-20 L. Ed. 135 says: "It is
evident that legislation founded upon
the war powers of the government,
and directed against the public enemies of the United States, is subject
to different considerations and limitations from those applicable to legislation founded upon the municipal
power of the government. . . . Legislation (founded on the war powers)
is subject to no limitations, except
such as are imposed by the law of
nations in the conduct of war. The
war powers of the government have
no express limitations in the constitution, and the only limitation to which
their exercise is subject is the law of
nations." In Stewart vs. Kahn (II
Wall, 493-20 L. Ed. 17) the Supreme
Court says: "The measures to be
taken in carrying on war and to suppress insurrections are not defined.
The decision of all such questions
rests wholly in the discretion of those
to whom the substantial powers involved are confided by the constitution." In construing the enumerated
power granted to Congress "to make
all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers," Chief Justice
Marshall said:
"We think the sound construction
of the Constitution must allow to the
national legislature that discretion,
with respect to the means by which
the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high
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duties assigned to it, in the manner
most beneficial to the people. Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the Constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."
In the light of the principles and
rules enunciated, and with the guidance afforded us by the eminent authorities cited, let us proceed to a
construction of the constitution necessary to sustain the validity of the
Conscription Act.
In addition to the unrestricted
powers granted to Congress to raise
and support armies, to provide and
maintain a navy, and to make rule.
for the government and regulation of
the land and naval forces, for the purpose of waging any war it may declare, Congress also is given the,
power "to provide for calling forth
the militia to execute the laws of the
Union, to suppress insutrections and
repel invasions" and "to provide for
organizing, arming and disciplining
the militia. . .

."

It is the attempt

to construe this added power over the
state militia for domestic purposes,
into a limitation upon the absolute
and unrestricted powers of Congress
over all its citizens for war purposes,
that furnishes the only apparent objection to the Conscription Act. We
say apparent objection advisedly, for
it is not a real objection.
True it is that, when Congress calls
forth the militia for the purely domestic purposes enumerated in the
constitution such militia cannot be
made to serve beyond the territorial
limits of the United States. The Supreme Court has so held. But these
decisions must be considered as hold-

ing simply this, and nothing more.
They can have no application to the
Conscription Act, because that act is
not founded upon the militia clause
of the Constitution at all. The Conscription Act is a legitimate exercise
of national sovereignty, and is founded upon the war powers expi'essly
granted in the Constitution, and calhforth all the citizens of the country,
without discrimination for the purpose of raising and maintaining an
army to wage a foreign war already
upon us. Mr. George W. Wickershaw, as Attorney General of the
United States, speaking of an Act of
Congress, of date March 27, 1908,
founded upon the militia power,
which attempted to authorize the
President to call the militia for use.
and when so called, to serve either
within or without the territory of the
United States," said: "If this provision were to be construed to authorize Congress to use the Organized
Militia for any other than the three
purposes specified, it would be unconstitutional." This opinion is said
to militate against the Conscription
Act. But note the language of this
eminent lawyer: "If this provision
is to be construed to authorize Congress to use the Organized Militia."
Organized Militia being capitalized,
clearly having reference, therefore,
to the Organized Militia as such. The
Conscription Act does nothing of the
kind and bears no similarity to the
act construed by Mr. Wickersham.
Furthermore, we are informed that
the one-time Attorney General, at the
recent meeting of the American Bar
Association stated that his official
opinion applied to an act founded on
the militia power of Congress, and
could have no application to the Conscription Act which is based solely
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upon the other war powers of Congress. Thus, all this argument and
citation of authority brought to the
attack of the Conscription Act, must
fall before the irrefutable logic of the
country justice of the peace, that
"they have no bearance on the case."
In the case of Burroughs vs. Peyton, 16 Gratton 475 the militia is defined as "a body of men composed of
citizens occupied temporarily in the
pursuit of civil life, while an army is
said to be a body of men whose business is war." Why should the militia
of the state be recognized as having
any greater right than other citizens
of the United States? Why should
they be exempted from the call of
their country in time of national peril
and disaster? Are they any less citizens of the United States because
they are militia? What divine right
of the State or what inalienable
character of its militia, exempts such
citizens from their country's call to
arms that every other citizen in the
land must answer? To so construe the
powers of congress as to give absolute exemption to the state militia, is
to put it into the p6wer of the state
to thwart the powers of Congress altogether; for, if a state may make
militia of some of its citizens it may
make militia of all. Thus would all
the war powers of congress be made
nugatory, except, indeed, the socalled power to raise a volunteer
army, and this exception, we submit,
is a rank contradiction in termspower to raise a volunteer. To raise
this absurd contention to the dignity
of a constitutional construction would
be to transform the already vanishing war power of Congress to a mere
glimmering hope that some patriots
might volunteer to come to the rescue
of their helpless country. The state

has no such power, and the citizen,
merely because he happens to be a
member of the state militia, has no
such exemption. The Constitution of
the United States and the Conscription Law enacted pursuant thereto,
are the supreme law of the land, "any
thing in the constitutions or !.ws of
any state to the contrary notwithstanding," as so prescribed in this
very language of the Constitution itself.
The Constitution makes no provision whatever for a national militia.
There is no such thing; and whoever
uses that phrase commits error. In
lieu of such national militia, Congress is empowered to call the state
militia to serve the same purposes in
the nation that they are organized tc
serve in their respective states. The
militia is a peace organization for domestic purposes only. The Constitution does make provision for a National Army. Congress is empowered
to call all the citizens of the United
States to serve the same purposes as
any army in the world may be made
to serve its nation. The National
Army is a war organization for the
purpose of waging war. There are
two express powers affecting the
militia, as such, for the domestic purposes enumerated. There are four
other express powers affecting the
citizens, as such, and these are for
purposes of war. No necessary relation exists between these militia
powers on the one hand and the four
war powers on the other hand. No
conflict need be invited in the process
of their construction. Indeed such
conflict can be and should be avoided.
In the absence of the two provisions
relating to the militia, no difficulty
would arise in the construction of the
four war powers first enumerated in
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the constitution which establish the
power of Congress to raise an army
by calling all its citizens. Why, then,
should the two provisions that follow,
granting added power to Congress
over an entirely distinct subject matter, be construed as a subtraction
from or a limitation upon the war
powers already enumerated and
granted without an "if".
In no important case has the discretionary power of Congress over
the means to be employed in the execution of any of its enumerated powers been denied by the Supreme
Court of the United States and a fixed
and arbitrary rule of construction applied instead. Nor will such a rule
of construction be adopted in this
case to deny the sound discretion exercised by Congress in the enactment
of the Conscription Act. "It would
have been an unwise attempt," says
Chief Justice Marshall (McCulloch
vs. Maryland) "to provide by immutable rules, for exegencies which,
if foreseen at all, must have been
seen dimly, and which can be best
provided for as they occur." Justice
Strong, in the second Legal Tender
Decision, says: "It was at such a
time and in such an emergency (Civil
War) that the Legal Tender Acts
were passed. Now, if it were certain
that nothing else would have supplied the absolute necessities of the
treasury, that nothing else would
have enabled the government to maintain its armies and navy, that nothing
else would have saved the government
and the Constitution from destruction, while the Legal Tender Acts
would, could any one be bold enough
to assert that Congress transgressed
its powers." Anent the war powers
of Congress the United States Supreme Court already has given ex-

pression to a strong opinion in the
Tarbel's Case 13 Wall. 408-20 L. Ed.
601. In this case the court said:
"Among the powers assigned to the
government is the power to raise and
support armies. . . . Its control over
the subject is plenary and exclusive.
It can determine without question
from any state authority how the
army shall be raised, whether by
voluntary enlistments or forced draft
the age at which the soldier shall be
received and the period for which
he shall be taken ,the compensation
he shall be allowed, and the service
to which he shall be assigned."
But what of the contentions against
the validity of the Conscription Act 5
The cardinal rule to be observed in
the interpretation of the constitution
is that effect must be given to the intention of the people who adopted it.
And this intention must be ascertained from the instrument itself,
from the very language used to ex-

press that intention. If this language
does not plainly import the intention,
if indeed, it be ambiguous, then resort may be had to the expressed pur.
poses for which -the instrument was
adopted and the government was established. If ambiguity still remains,
then, and not until then, have we a
right to consider matters extraneou
of the constitution itself in aid of itf

interpretation.
We strenuously deny that any
ambiguity exists as to the nature or

extent of the war powers granted to
Congress in the Constitution. The
language used in the grant of these
powers is so plain and unequivocal
that "he that runs may read." These
powers appear in four enumerations
of Sec. 8, Article I. ante, each without a word, phrase, clause or sentence, qualifying or restricting the
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power, as for instance, the power "to
declare war" and "to raise and support armies."
The only contention against the
Conscription Act which is based upon
any construction of the language of
the Constitution at all, is the persistent fallacy of construing the Act as
an exercise of power over the state
militia in virtue of the separately
enumerated grant of such power, instead of construing it, as Congress
expressly declares it to be and as it
clearly is, an exercise of the war
powers in virtue of the four enumerated grants of power for such purpose. We have already adverted to
this. The enumerated powers of Congress over the state militia also need
no aid in their construction. Their
language too is plain and unequivocal.
In the absence of any declaration of
war by Congress and the enactment
by it of a law such as the Conscription Act for raising a national army,
neither Congress nor the President
can call and use the state militia, as
such, for purposes other than those
enumerated in the Constitution,
namely: "to execute the laws of the
Union, to suppress insurrection and
repel invasions." That the militia,
who are mere peace officers, have always been recognized as having immunity from service "outside the
realm" is admitted, and that "such
immunity was a thousand years old"
in Great Britain before the adoption
of our Constitution. But that any
citizen of any civilized country under
the sun since the dawn of time ever
held immunity from his country's call
to war, we emphatically deny. Even
England, as is well known, has used
her citizens as soldiers for the prosecution of wars, both offensive and
defensive, everywhere throughout
her whole history, despite the much

vaunted immunity of the militia.
And the acts of Parliament declaring
such wars and raising armies to wage
them did not constitute any amendments to the so-called British Constitution, but were the legitimate and
frequent exercise of the sovereign
power inherent in every organized
government, whether autocratic or
democratic.
The debates in the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 are palpably perverted and misapplied In argument
against the Conscription Act. That
convention was created by Congress
to amend the Articles of Confede-ation, but it found that instrument so
defective as not to admit of correction. The convention, therefore,
abandoned altogether the purpose for
which it was called, and instead,
adopted the Constitution which it reported to Congress with the recommendation that it be referred to the
States, to be by them in turn submitted to the people for adoption. In
this manner was the United States
Government established. So inherently defective were the Articles of
Confederation that they were thus
rejected as an entirety. And the one
defect that stood out more prominently than all the others, was the
utter inadequacy of power in the
United States Government to wage
war and to raise and support armies;
the utter inefficiency of the state
militia as a war organization upon
which the General Government was
made to depend. To obviate for all
time this defect, which almost proved
fatal to the success of the revolution
and to our independence, and to make
of the United States under the Constitution a powerful nation, equal in
sovereignty to every other state in
the international world, there were
adopted by that Constitutional Con-
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vention the four unrestricted powers,
namely: to declare war, to raise and
support armies, to provide and main-,
tain a navy, and to govern the land,
and naval forces. The intention of.
the patriots who framed the Constitution and the people who- adopted
it is to be derived from the plain language used by them to express that
intention and to create the power
granted, and not by resort to any
individual construction put upon the
conflicting statements made in convention debate. And yet, there are a
few men insisting in this manner
upon such a construction of the Constitution as will make the United
States of today still dependent upon
the state militia and, in fact, more
impotent and inefficient than it was
under the Articles of Confederation,
-a contention so palpably absurd as
to provoke -derision and contempt.
The real solution of the militia and
war power controversy in the Constitutional Convention is this: No
national militia was created at all,
but instead the states were permitted
to retain their respective militia and
the General Government empowered
to call and use these militia for the
enumerated national peace purposes
of executing the laws of the Union, to
suppress insurrection and repel invasions. And to obviate the grave
defect and impotency in the National
Government of having to depend
upon the state militia in time of war,
the four enumerated war powers
were conferred without any limitation whatever as to the extent of
those powers or the means by which
they were to be exercised.
Except for the purposes of the
Civil War, when President Lincoln
and the Congress did not hesitate to
adopt the conscription and enforced
draft, it has always been the policy

of the government to depend upon
the state militia for domestic purposes and upon the volunteer system
for general war purposes. This policy
of the Government has been uniformly criticised and condemned by military men and writers on the military
unpreparedness of the United States.
And President Wilson in his public
speeches plainly pointed out the inadequacy of this policy in the present
world-war crisis, as a reason why the
Congress .hould enact the Conscription Law. And yet, strange as it may
seem, these criticisms of the government for adhering to such a policy
are cited as establishing the principle
that the Government is powerless to
raise an army by any other than the
militia and volunteer systems. This
furnishes the perfect example of the
boomerang in argument. Instead of
establishing the invalidity of the Conscription Act, these criticisms have
at last influenced Congress to exercise its discretionary power of raising a national army by the more adequate means of Conscription and
these military men and writers now
are approving the congressional
action.
We have no patience with the contention for a construction of the constitution that would make the United
States more impotent and inefficient
than it was under the Articles of
Confederation, and that would leave
it a pitiable and humiliating spectacle
in the gaze of the international world
-a sovereign nation shorn of its inherent power to wage war and raise
and support armies; to resist wanton
assaults upon' its sovereign rights,
and threatened destruction of its institutions; unable to defend its citizens or to prevent the substitution of
an autocracy for the present glorious
freedom of its people. And yet we see
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this very contention emblazoned, by
a few, in speech and petition, with all
the fallacy, sophistry and vociferousness of the demagogue. No wonder
the great Lincoln was stirred to real
eloquence and just wrath by the same
ill-timed and illogical contention
against the conscription act of the
Civil War that is urged against the
present act, to give expression to the
following opinion in support of the
power of Congress validly to enact
such a law. President Lincoln said:
"In this case, those who desire the
rebellion to succeed, and others who
seek reward in .a different way, are
very active in accommodating us with
this class of arguments. They tell us
the law is unconstitutional. It is the
first instance, I believe, in which the
power of Congress to do a thing has
ever been questioned in a case when
the power is given by the Constitution in express terms. Whether a
power can be implied when it is not
expressed has often been the subject
of controversy; but this is the first
case in which the degree of effrontery
has been ventured upon by denying a
power which is plainly and distinctly
written down in the Constitution.
The Constitution declares that 'the
Congress shall have power . . . to
raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall
be for a longer time than two years.'
The whole scope of the conscription
act is 'to raise and support armies.'
There is nothing else in it. . . . Do
you admit that the power is given to
raise and support armies, and yet insist that by this act Congress has not
exercised the power in a constitutional mode, has not done the thing in
the right way? Who is to judge that?
The Constitution gives Congress the
power, but it does not prescribe the
mode, or expressly declare who shall

prescribe it. In such case Congress
must prescribe the mode or relinquish the power. There is no alternative. . . . The power is given
fully, completely, unconditionally. It
is not a power to raise armies if state
authorities consent; nor if the men to
compose the armies are entirely willing; but it is a power to raise and
support armies given to Congress by
the Constitution without an 'if.'....
The principle of the draft, which simply is involuntary or enforced service, is not new. It has been practiced in all ages of the world. It was
well known to the framers of our
Constitution as one of the modes of
raising armies, at the time they
placed in that instrument the provision that 'the Congress shall have
power to raise and support armies'
Wherein is the peculiar hardship now?"
The foregoing opinion was quoted
by Honorable Charles E. Hughes, late
Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, in his recent address before
the American Bar Association. Mr.
Hughes commented on this opinion as
follows: "These are the words of
Lincoln, penned in the midst of the
Civil War, in which conscription was
enforced, and his reasoning is conclusive. And while the question was
not presented to the United States
Supreme Court, the power of Congress was explicitly recognized in
Tarbel's case. 13 Wall. 407,-20 L. Ed.
600, and in later opinions."
"To provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare,
and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity" and "to
make the (United States and the)
world safe for democracy," the Congress has recognized a state of war
existing against us and has enacted
the Conscription Law as the neces-
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sary means for raising and maintaining an army to wage this war. If it
be said that these means resorted to
by Congress in the enforced draft,
and by the President as Commander
in Chief of the army in using our
forces to fight a foreign foe on foreign fields, are extraordinary means,
it must immediately be replied that
the conditions confronting us too are
extraordinary and cannot be met by
any other means. A war-mad military autocracy, which can be compared only to the very "Gates of
Hell" described by the Scriptures, is
trying to prevail against Christianity, civilization and international law,
to impose upon us and the world
their military domination and to destroy the constitutional democracy
which now is our glorious heritage.
We firmly believe that the sound
discretion exercised by Congress in
the adoption of the Conscription Act
as the means of raising an army for
use in the present world-war crisis
will be sustained by the United States
Supreme Court, just as such discretionary right of Congress as to the
means to be used has always been
recognized in every important exercise of its power under the Constitution. Witness the decisions sustaining the National Bank Act, the Confiscation Acts of the Civil War, the
Legal Tender Act, the Sherman AntiTrust Law and the Adamson Eighthour Law.

Would it not be a violation of the
fundamental principle of our institutions, that one of the separate departments of the government shall not
usurp power committed by the Constitution to another department, for
the Judiciary in this case to deny to
the Legislative Branch the war
powers and the discretionary means
of exercising them when they are ex.
pressly conferred upon The Congress
by the Constitution?
Are not these war powers and their
exercise by Congress, and the power
of the Executive, as Commander in
Chief of the Army, to fight on foreign
fields, political powers for which The
Congress and the President, respectively, are answerable only to the people,-political powers over which the
Judiciary can assume no jurisdiction
whatever?
We believe that the Judiciary will
be in unison with the Legislative and
Executive branches of the Government in respect of these powers and
the means of their exercise; and that,
as a result, our country will emerge
from this national crisis and worldwar triumphant and victorious, with
the sun of American Democracy shining throughout the world more brilliantly than ever before, and with the
Flag of the United States floating
higher in the heavens, inspiring renewed love and patriotism in the people at home and a lasting gratitude
and respect in the peoples abroad.
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CASE

AND

1. In Sprey vs. Kiser, 102 S. E.
708, the North Carolina court held a
druggist civilly responsible for the
death of a baby resulting from the
sale of a dangerous drug. The court
further held on the facts, that the
action was properly brought in contract or tort. Generally speaking, a
druggist is liable for injuries to, or
death of a person, resulting from the
sale of dangerous drugs, -but the
liability rests upon the principle of
negligence. The druggist owes his
customers the legal obligation of
ordinary care in the sale of his products; but ordinary care is a relative
term. It means the highest degree of
care and caution consistent with the
conduct of the business. The decision
.n this case places druggists in the
legal category of public servants,
such as innkeepers and carriers, and
reflects a progressive tendency to extend the liability of all persons who
render service in any form to the
public, for all injuries resulting from
their negligent acts.
2. The Court of Appeals of
Georgia renders an interesting decision in the case of Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. vs. Hand, 102 S. E. 647,
wherein it is held that in an action on
an insurance policy the conviction of
insured for manslaughter did not
render inadmissible his evidence that
the death of the insured was accidental. The court does not discuss
the principle at length nor cite any
authority in support of it. The question involved here is disputed, however, by a few courts, but the decision
in the case is clearly sound. A judgment of conviction in a criminal actFon is inadmissible to establish th
facts upon which it is based in a civil
action. It does not vary the rule of

COMMENT
law in this case that judgment was
sought to be contravterted as to those
facts. The proceedings are entirely
different and no rule of res adfuditata sanctions the reciprocal admissibility of civil and criminal judgments for the reason that their purposes differ, the procedure differs, the
rules of evidence differ and the proceedings do not affect the identical
parties. Those cases admitting a
criminal judgment as evidence in a
civil action are exceptional, as where
the civil action is based directly on
the judgment. The case is therefore
properly decided.
3. In Ellington vs. Rides, 102 S.
E. 510, the North Carolina Court held
that a person who installs a machine
on the premises of another is an invitee and can hold the owner liable
for defective condition thereof even
though the injury results while the
plaintiff is doing an act not strictly
within the terms of the invitation.
The court said: "A slight departure
in the ordinary aberrations or casualties of travel do nof change the rule
of liability and hence the protection
of the law is extended to him while
lawfully on that portion of the premises reasonably embraced within the
object of his visit." This decision is
questionable. An owner of premises
is liable for negligent condition
thereof only as long as the invitee
exercises the invitation strictly in accordance with its terms. This the
plaintiff failed to do in going to another part of the property as the case
showed merely for curiosity and not
for a reason connected with the object of his invitation. The instant,
therefore, he exceeded the terms of
his invitation the relation between
the Varties was suspended, he be-
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came a mere trespasser and should
bear the risks resulting from his own
misconduct.
4. Cobble vs. Royal, 219 S. W.
118, a Missouri case, was an action-to
recover on a mutual benefit insurance
certificate. In denying a recovery
the court held that a by-law, providing that proof of death can not be
based on the legal presumption of
death arising from seven years' absence and substituting a like rule
based on expectancy of life of insured, was valid. The court gave as
its reason the fact that the seven
years' absence presumption is a mere
rule of evidence and can be abrogated
by contract. The case is intensely instructive and contains a valuable dissenting opinion. The decision, limiting it to the facts, is sustainable. A
member of a society is conclusively
bound by all its by-laws pro.vided they
are legal and reasonable. There was
no contention in the case that it was
void because unreasonable, the only
argument being that it was illegal.
Now, a by-law is illegal if it violates
some principle of public policy
whether it be manifested by a statute
or by a common law rule. The seven
years' absence presumption is, as the
court stated, a mere rule of evidence
which can be abrogated by contract
and is not a rule of public policy like
a clause making decision of the society conclusive. The destinction established in the case is therefore valid
and is applied generally throughout
the law of contract. Rules of evidence can be abrogated by contract,
but principles of public policy are
beyond the power of abrogation by
the parties.
5. Hurlbut vs. Bradley, 109 Atl.
171, a Connecticut case, holds that an
indorser of a note discharged by

failure of holder to give him notice of
dishonor, removes his liability by a
promise to pay the note. This is the
rule of the Law Merchant and under
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law. The decision is absolutely
sound. When an indorser is discharged by failure to receive notice
of dishonor, the debt itself is not discharged, but only the indorser is personally relieved from the obligation
to pay the note. When he'promises
to pay it therefore he waives the defense that he would otherwise possess, revives the original obligation
and is liable as though notice of dishonor had been regularly given.
6. The recent Illinois case of Ford
vs. Greenwalt establishes an important precedent. The Supreme
Court held that where a will shows
by its terms that it was not intended
to be revoked by marriage of the testator, the intention is controlling and
the statutes does not revoke the will.
In other words the decision substantially holds the statute is not an arbitrary rule of law, but is a mere rule
of evidence, the operation of which
can be avoided by appropriate testamentary expression. The opinion of
the court, while not entirely logical,
is interesting, and no doubt properly
and reasonably construes the statute.
The statute as above stated provides
that if a single man makes a will his
subsequent marriage revokes it. The
policy of the statute is to induce him
by revoking his original will to make
a second will, thereby reconsidering
the provisions of the original instrument, in view of the altered conditions in person and property resulting from the marriage. But cessante
ratione, cessat lex: where the reason
for a law ceases to apply, the law itself no longer exists. Hence in this
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case since, when he made his will he
contemplated marriage, he considered
the changes it would create and naturally it can be inferred that he
moulded the will to meet such postmarital conditions. There was, therefore, no reason for holding the
statute applicable and court effectuating the clearly defined intention of
the testator, probated it as his last
will.
There are several miscellaneous
recent decisions on varied subjects in
the law . For instance, in Gibbs vs.
Almstone, 176 N. W. 173, the Minnesota court held that under -rule of

avoidable consequences, a person who
has sustained injury is not legally required to submit to an operation.
Again, in O'Connor vs. McCabe,
176 N. W .43, the South Dakota court
held that equity will reform a voluntary conveyance of realty in an action
between grantee and heirs at law of
grantor.
Lastly, in Elms vs. Flick, 126 N. E.
66, the Ohio court held, a father who
had provided an automobile for the
general use of the family, was not
liable for negligence of his son who
at time of injury was driving several
of his friends on a pleasure trip.
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PROSPECTUS AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE
COLLEGE OF LAW FOR 1920-1921.
American Reporter system, American Decisions, American Reports,
American State Reports; English
Ruling Cases; British Ruling Cases;
American and English Annotated
Cases; American Annotated Cases;
Moak's English Reports; Petersdorf's Abridgment; American & English Corporation Cases; Moore's International Law Digest; American &
English Encyc. of Law; Cyc., Ruling
Case Law, Words & Phrases; Encyc,
of Pleading & Practise; Encyc. of
Evidence; Standard Encyc. of Pleading & Practise; hundreds of text
books, of the old and modern writers.
There are the Indiana Supreme and
Appellate Court Reports, complete;
New York Common-law Reports;
New York Court of Appeals Reports,
Vermont Reports.
There are now coming the state
reports of the individual states of
Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, WisPennsylvania
Minnesota,
consin,
Massachusetts, Missouri, California
and Connecticut. Arrangements have
been made for acquiring the state reports of all the states to the point
where the Reporter System begins to
publish them, and the Codes and
LAW LIBRARY.
Statutes have also been applied for,
so that the law of every state will be
The law library, quite extensive
made available to every law student.
and adequate for the needs of our
The library has a capacity of
large and growing law school, is conthousand volumes, is admirtwenty
tinually augumented by the arrival
with stacks, tables and
equipped
ably
of new books. There are the U. S,
ceiling, is perfectly
has
high
chairs,
Supreme Court Reports, complete;
night, and like the
and
day
lighted,
Federal Cases; Federal Reporter;
class
rooms, is so arand
room
court
United States Statutes and Digests;
as to afford the
for
cared
-and
Meyers' Federal Decisions; The Na- ranged
and
convenient
tional Reporter System, complete most commodious,
With Digests; Lawyers' Reports An- cheerful accomodations for efficient
notated, both old and new series; use.

With the year 1919-1920, the College of Law of the University of Notre Dame began a new era. This
year, for the first time in the history
of the old school, the law men are
afforded a distinctive law building all
their own, and a law atmosphere
separate and apart from the other
schools and colleges. These features,
together with the splendid new and
modern equipment and facilities for
conducting the law course, lend dignity to the School, offer singular advantages to the law students and
stimulate in them a zest for studying,
understanding and learning the law.
Nowhere in the country are these
conditions better.
The pictorial review of the school,
which appears in this issue of the Reporter, presents an external view of
the Hoynes College of Law, named
in honor of William Hoynds, Dean.
Emeritus, whose lifelong labors laid
the splendid foundation for the
present School of Law. A glimpse is
also given of each of the four large
rooms of the building, the library,
court room and class rooms.

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
COURT ROOM.

such large rooms which together with
the court room, afford ample acThe court room, which is a marvel comodation for the large student
,of beauty and perfection, is con- body and the entire faculty of the
veniently located on the ground floor, School of Law.
-opposite the law library. The court
,room, in its equipment, arrangement
-and faithful compliance with the requisites of the actual court, is in fact
superior to many real court chambers. Here are held the various sessions of the University courts in the
strictest observance of the procedural law,-pleading, practise and evidence,-trial and appellate. We have
only to refer to the present issue of
the Notre Dame Law Reporter,
which, as an exhibit, speaks for itself, to confirm our statements.
A glimpse of the Notre Dame Circuit Court in session may be seen in
the accompanying pictorial review.
A pretentious bench for the judge,
perfect accomodations for the jury,
ample room at the bar for litigants
and their attorneys, witness box,
stenographer's table, and offices for
the clerk, sheriff and bailiff of the
court. The bar is raised and separated from the lobby, which has a
seating capacity of one hundred.

CLASS ROOMS.
The class rooms, like the court
room, are equipped with the beautiful and substantial American, steel
pedestal, tablet arm chairs, the latest
word in modern lecture room accomodation. One hundred and fifty
of these mahogany finished chairs arc
arranged in semi-circula r form in
front of the instructor's rostrum,
constituting such an efficient and attractive spectacle as almost to speak
law for themselves. There are twe

ORGANIZATION

AND SYSTEM.

The law faculty comprises six
resident instructors, all of whom are
graduates of the leading law schools
of the country, most of them experienced in the practice of law, and
three of whom have been regular
judges of city, and circuit courts.
Four of the faculty devote their entire time and service to the School of
Law while the other members of the
faculty also engage in the law .practice.
The classes of the course are arranged in groups according to their
relationship and the logical order of
their study and with due regard to
the time to be devoted to each class
subject. These classes are assigned
to the various instructors with a view
to ,the instructor's special qualification and experience to teach them.
The course is conducted under the
careful supervision of the dean of the
department to the end that the best
methods may be applied and the
highest degree of efficiency attained
in the teaching department, therebassuring the students the greatest
possible measure of success in the
course.
A special advantage to the law student at Notre Dame is his daily association with the instructors and the
personal assistance rendered him and
the special interest taken in him by
the law faculty as well as by the ad.
ministrative officers of the University.
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METHODS OF INSTRUCTION.
Experience at Notre Dame has
confirmed the opinions of eminent
law teachers that the case method
alone is not adequate to teach a
thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the law. Excellent as the
case method is for imparting a knowledge of the particular principles of
the law applicable in the cases analyzed, a general idea of the law as a
whole, its main features and its universal concepts can not be learned
without the aid of the text-book.
Therefore the law is taught here by
text-book assignments as well as
cases, both explained and illustrated
by the class-room talks of the instructors. In addition to these daily
assignments, frequent written tests
and the quarterly examinations arc
given, and class records are kept of
the students' work.

sources of the law, custom, judicial
decisions and legislation; judicial
systems and the processes of the
courts; higher court decisions as
precedents and the reporter system;
the law divided into two great
branches, the substantive law and the
law of procedure-rights and remedies-and these branches again divided respectively into the law of
contracts, wrongs and property and
practice, pleading and evidence ,these
in turn divided into the special
branches of the prescribed course;
where to find the law; how to study
the law.
THE LAW AND HOW TO PRACTICE IT.

The lawyer's profession is a practical one and most law students intend to practice the law. It is frequently said of the law schools of the
country that their courses are not
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY practical, that they teach the subOF LAW.
stantive law to the exclusion of the
As an introduction to the study of more practical branch of the law, the
law the students are given a course law of procedure.
The substantive law operates proof preliminary lectures to acquaint
them in a general way with the sys- prio vigore to establish the rights and
tem of law as a whole, its various obligations of parties. When such
classifications and those concepts and right is violated the substantive law
principles underlying the whole law creates a secondary right which is
so necessary to an intelligent and denominated a right of action. Then
successful study of the various it is that the law of procedure apbranches of the law prescribed in the plies, and it is the knowledge of this
course for study. These lectures law that enables the practitioner to
may be briefly outlined as follows: invoke the jurisdiction of the courts
the nature of law; law as it effects and the strong arm of the state to
the individual, organized society and, secure his client's rights and renations; the system of American dress his wrongs. A law course.
jurisprudence; the common-law and therefore, to be practical should teach
equity systems, their origin, develop- not only the substantive law but alsc
ment and relation; our constitutional the law of procedure.
and statutory law systems and their
To meet this condition the law
relation to the common law; the course as now prescribed at Notre
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Dame is intended not only to teach are kept in operation throughout the
the law but how to practice it as well, three years of the law course. The
Provision has been made for a sys- Criminal Practise Court is open to
tematic course in civil procedure ahd the first year law students for crimia thorough and practical court sys- nal pleading and practice immediatetem to operate throughout the entire ly after the course in criminal law
and procedure. Hypothetical cases
three years of study.
are submitted to regularly chosen
grand juries and prosecuting attorCOURSE OF PROCEDURE.
neys-and indictments are voted and
In addition to criminal procedure returned. Warrants are issued, arwhich is taught in the first year rests made and attorneys appointed
Motions to
there is also a preliminary course in for the defendants.
civil procedure consisting of the quash are argued, pleas entered and
study of common-law and equity arguments made before the court and
courts, the original writs and pro- jury on the question of conviction or
cesses, the common-law forms of ac- acquittal. Many hypothetical cases
tion and remedies and relief in are submitted to the students for the
equity. Not only does this serve as preparation of affidavits and indicta beginning of the course in practical ments thereon and for argument in
procedure but it enables the law stu- the court. Thus all the students are
dent from the outset to better under- given a start in court practice in their
stand the substantive law taught first year. The University Moot
through the application of the corn Court is kept busy throughout the
mon-law actions and remedies. This junior year in the preparation and
course is followed in the second yeai argument of cases on the law apby a complete course of pleadings and plicable to hypothetical statements of
practice at common-law, the making fact, principally in civil cases. When
of issues in the various common-law the law of evidence is taught in
actions, equity pleading in general course of the second year the Notre
and as applied in the federal courts, Dame Circuit Court opens, and here
and pleading and practice under the the students apply all the law procode. The third year is devoted tc cedure, pleading, practice and evithe making of issues in the principal dence. Throughout the senior year
civil actions under the code, trial practice is had with a view of teachpractice and appellate procedure. ing the students how to make trial
The course in federal procedure is al- records, save exceptions and avail
themselves of alleged error on apso given in this year.
peal to the Supreme Court. Each
candidate for a degree is required to
THE UNIVERSITY COURTS.
prepare at least one record and
These consist of the Criminal Prac- transcript together with an assigntise Court, -the University Moot ment of error and brief thereon in
Court, the Notre Dame Circuit the Supreme Court of Notre Dame.
Court and the Supreme Court of
These courts are all fully organizNotre Dame. These courts constitute ed, have their regular officers and
a thorough and practical system And official records. Four students are
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NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
assigned to each case and all are thus
made to engage in the active practice. It is thought that this system
of procedure and practice will so
qualify the graduate that he may
with confidence in himself begin the
active practice of his profession.
COURSES OF STUDY.
The prescribed course of study in
the Law School itself covers a period
of three years and leads to the Degree of Bachelor of Laws. An additional year of resident, graduate
work in the school merits the Degree
of Master of Laws. The requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
Laws or Doctor of Civil Laws are
prescribed by the University and the
College of Law upon proper application therefor.
A six-year course has also been
arranged by which two degrees may
be acquired,--the degree from the
College of Arts or Science or Commerce and the degree from the College of Law.
RESUIREMENTS FOR
ADMISSION.
Students who have a bachelor's degree or who have completed at least
one year of college work, the equivalent of thd courses prescribed in the
University, are eligible to enter the
three year course of law as candidates for the degrees.

Graduates of a four year high
school or preparatory school of recognized standing, evidenced by diploma
or certificate from such school, will
be admitted to he four-year course,
the first year of which consists of certain college subjects, some prescribed
and some elective and including the
elements of law.
Those who have not high school
graduation or certified credits equal
to those required for entrance into
the other colleges of the University,
may obtain such credits by examination in the subjects required, and may
acquire additional credits by taking
the courses outlined for the regular
school year and the summer school of
the University.
A few men of advanced age and
practical business or office experience, who are otherwise specially
qualified for the study of the law,
may apply to the University for admission as special students.
Students of other law schools will
be given such advanced rating in the
School of Law as warranted by the
character of the school from which,
they come and the certificate of
credits attained there. Only schools
of known repute and standing as
compare favorably with the College
of Law of the University of Notre
Dame will be recognized, whether
they be in or out of any association.
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SCHEDULE OF CLASSES.

FIRST YEAR

Second Semester

First Semester.
Weeks Periods

Introductory Lectures and
Study of Cases
18
Principles of Liability
and Damages
18
Common-law Actions
18
Contracts
18
Criminal Law & Procedure 18
Selected Reading
18
Public Speaking
18

Weeks Periods

Persons and Domestic
1
2
2
5
2
1
1

Relations
Common-law Pleading
,Forms
Torts
Sales (8) Bailments (5)
Personal Property
Criminal Practice Court
Public Speaking

18

2

18
18
13
5
18
18

2
5
5
5
1
1

18

5

18
12
6
18
18

5
5
5
a
2

18

1

YEAR.
4
Public Utilities
Municipal Corporations
9
5
Conflict of Laws
12
Federal Procedure
6
Legal Ethics
18
Constitutional Law
Trial and Appellate Pract. 18
Notre Dame Circuit Court
Supreme Court of N. D.

5
5
5
5
5
3.
2

JUNIOR YEAR.
Agency
Partnership
Real Property
Finding & Briefing Law
Wills & Decedents Estates
Evidence
Civil Pleading
Junior Moot Court
Public Speaking

8
10
18
2
16
18
18

5
5
5
5
5
3
2

18

1

SENIOR
Quasi Contracts
Private Corporations
Suretyship
Bankruptcy
Constitutional Law
General Practical Plead.
Notre Dame Circuit Court
Suprme Court of N. D.

4
14
10
8
18
18

5
5
5
5
3
2

Equity and Trusts
Real Property, Mortgages,
Liens, Conveyancing
Bills & Notes
Insurance
Evidence
Code, Equity Pleading
Notre Dame Circuit Court
Public Speaking
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